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"YOU HAVE DISCUSSED
LEPERS AND CROOKS":
SANISM IN CLINICAL TEACHING
MICHAEL L. PERLIN*
There has been virtually no attention paid to the role of sanism
in the clinical setting. Sanism is an irrational prejudice of the same
quality and character of other irrational prejudices that cause and are
reflected in prevailing social attitudes of racism, sexism, homophobia
and ethnic bigotry. It permeates all aspects of mental disability law,
and affects all participants in the mental disability law system: fact
finders, counsel, expert and lay witnesses. Sanist myths exert espe-
cially great power over lawyers who represent persons with mental
disabilities. These phenomena are especially troubling in the clinical
setting, in which students are exposed for the first time to the skills
that go to the heart of the lawyering process. The difficulties can be
further exacerbated when the clinical teacher - either overtly or co-
vertly - expresses sanist thoughts or reifies sanist myths. This article
will explore the meaning of sanism, the general impact of sanism on
the representation of persons with mental disabilities, the special
problems faced when sanism infects the clinical teaching process, and
some tentative solutions to this dilemma.
INTRODUCTION
There is a robust clinical literature on how issues of race, class,
gender, and sexual orientation may influence all aspects of the clinical
setting: on the relationship between student and client, between stu-
dents, between student and clinical supervisor; the attitude of the fact-
finder toward the clinical client and student lawyer.1 But there has
been virtually no attention paid to the role of sanism in the clinical
* Professor of Law, New York Law School. I wish to thank Jeanie Bliss for her invalu-
able research assistance, Betsy Fiedler for her excellent editing assistance, and the partici-
pants at the New York Law School Clinical Theory Workshop (especially Gene Cerruti)
and the UCLA/Lake Arrowhead International Clinical Workshop for their helpful
recommendations.
1 See, e.g., Jane Aiken, Striving to Teach "Justice, Fairness, and Morality," 4 CLIN. L.
REV. 1 (1997); Jon Dubin, Faculty Diversity as a Clinical Legal Education Imperdtive, 51
HASTINGs L.J. 445 (2000); Bill Ong Hing, Raising Personal Identification of Class, Race,
Ethnicity, Gender, Sexual Orientation, Physical Disability, and Age in Lawyering Courses,
45 STAN. L. REV. 1807 (1993); Kevin Johnson & Amagda Perez, Clinical Legal Education
and the U.C. Davis Immigration Law Clinic: Putting Theory into Practice and Practice into




Sanism is an irrational prejudice of the same quality and charac-
ter as other irrational prejudices that cause and are reflected in pre-
vailing social attitudes of racism, sexism, homophobia and ethnic
bigotry. 2 It permeates all aspects of mental disability law and affects
all participants in the mental disability law system: litigants, fact find-
ers, counsel, expert and lay witnesses.3 Its corrosive effects have
warped mental disability law jurisprudence in involuntary civil com-
mitment law, institutional law, tort law, and all aspects of the criminal
process (pretrial, trial and sentencing). It reflects what civil rights law-
yer Florynce Kennedy has characterized the "pathology of
oppression." 4
Sanist myths exert especially great power over lawyers who re-
present persons with mental disabilities.5 The use of stereotypes, typi-
fication, and deindividualization inevitably means that sanist lawyers
will trivialize both their client's problems and the importance of any
eventual solution to these problems. Sanist lawyers implicitly and ex-
plicitly question their clients' competence and credibility,6 a move that
significantly impairs the lawyers' advocacy efforts.7
2 See generally MICHAEL L. PERLIN, THE HIDDEN PREJUDICE: MENTAL DISABILITY
ON TRIAL (2000) (PERLIN, HIDDEN PREJUDICE). The classic study is GORDON W. ALL-
PORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE (1955). But see ELISABETH YOUNG-BRUEHL, THE
ANATOMY OF PREJUDICES (1996).
The phrase "sanism" was, to the best of my knowledge, coined by Dr. Morton Birn-
baum. See Morton Birnbaum, The Right to Treatment: Some Comments on its Develop-
ment, in MEDICAL, MORAL AND LEGAL ISSUES IN HEALTH CARE 97, 106-07 (Frank Ayd
ed., 1974) (Birnbaum, Right to Treatment: Comments). See also Koe v. Califano, 573 F.2d
761, 764 n.12 (2d Cir. 1978). Dr. Birnbaum is universally regarded as having first developed
and articulated the constitutional basis of the right to treatment doctrine for institutional-
ized mental patients. See Morton Birnbaum, The Right to Treatment, 46 A.B.A. J. 499
(1960), discussed in 2 MICHAEL L. PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW: CIVIL AND CRIMI-
NAL § 3A-2.1, at 8-12 (2d ed. 1999) (PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW).
I recognize that the use of the word "sanism" (based on the root "sane" or "sanity") is
troubling from another perspective: The notion of "sanity" or "insanity" is a legal construct
that has been rejected by psychiatrists, psychologists, and other behavioralists for over 150
years. I nevertheless use it here, in part to reflect the way in which inaccurate, outdated
and distorted language has confounded the underlying political and social issues, and to
demonstrate, ironically, how ignorance continues to contribute to this bias.
3 On the way that sanism affects lawyers' representation of clients, see PERLIN, HID-
DEN PREJUDICE, supra note, 2 at 28, 55-56.
4 See Birnbaum, Right to Treatment: Comments, supra note 2, at 107 (quoting Ken-
nedy). See also id. at 106 ("It should be understood that sanists are bigots"). For a more
recent consideration in this context, see Bruce Link et al., The Consequences of Stigma for
Persons with Mental Illness: Evidence from the Social Sciences, in STIGMA AND MENTAL
ILLNESS 87 (Paul Fink & Allan Tasman eds., 1992) (STIGMA).
5 See Michael L. Perlin, On "Sanism", 46 SMU L. REV. 373 (1992).
6 See Michael L. Perlin, Pretexts and Mental Disability Law: The Case of Competency,
47 U. MIAMI L. REV. 625 (1993).
7 See Keri K. Gould & Michael L. Perlin, "Johnny's in the Basement/Mixing Up His
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These phenomena are especially troubling in the clinical setting,
in which students are exposed for the first time to the skills that go to
the heart of the lawyering process: interviewing, investigating, coun-
seling and negotiating. All of these are difficult for us (and our stu-
dents) to learn, but this difficulty is significantly increased when the
client is a person with mental disability (or one so perceived). The
difficulties can be further exacerbated when the clinical teacher - ei-
ther overtly or covertly - expresses sanist thoughts or reifies sanist
myths. And sanism problems continue at every "critical moment" of
the clinical experience: the initial interview, the case preparation, case
conferences, planning of litigation (and/or negotiation) strategy, trial
preparation, trial and appeal.
This article will explore (1) the meaning of sanism, (2) the general
impact of sanism on the representation of persons with mental disabil-
ities (looking closely at the specific ethical dilemmas raised in these
cases, the conflicts often faced by lawyers doing this work, and the
special roles that such lawyers must perform), (3) the special problems
faced when sanism infects the clinical teaching process, and (4) some
tentative solutions to this dilemma.
My title draws on Bob Dylan's brilliant masterpiece, Ballad of a
Thin Man.8 Interpretations of this song abound, but no one has con-
tradicted Robert Shelton's conclusion that it is about "an observer
who does not see." 9 One of its central couplets begins:
You've been with the professors
And they've all liked your looks.
With great lawyers you have
Discussed lepers and crooks10
Since I started teaching a clinic in 1984, I have had this verse in
my mind. Clinical teachers are professors who are lawyers. And
clinical clients, all too often, strike clinical students as being "lepers
and crooks." If we, like the eponymous Thin Man, allow ourselves to
be "observer[s] who [do] not see," we will fall prey to sanism's corro-
sive and malignant power.
I. THE MEANING OF SANISM
Sanism is as insidious as other "isms"11 and is, in some ways, even
Medicine": Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Clinical Teaching, 24 SEATTLE L. REV. 339(2000).
8 BOB DYLAN, LYRICS, 1962-1985, at 198 (1985).
9 ROBERT SHELTON, No DIRECTION HOME: THE LIFE AND MUSIC OF BOB DYLAN 280
(DaCapo ed., 1997).
10 DYLAN, supra note 8, at 198.
11 Michael L. Perlin, "What's Good Is Bad, What's Bad Is Good, You'll Find out When
You Reach the Top, You're on the Bottom": Are the Americans with Disabilities Act (And
Spring 20031
CLINICAL LAW REVIEW
more troubling, because it is largely invisible, to a considerable degree
socially acceptable, and frequently practiced (consciously and uncon-
sciously) by individuals who ordinarily take "liberal" or "progressive"
positions decrying similar biases and prejudices involving gender,
race, ethnicity and/or sexual orientation. 12 It is a form of bigotry that
"respectable people can express in public."'1 3 Like other "isms," san-
ism is based largely upon stereotype, myth, superstition and dei-
ndividualization. To sustain and perpetuate it, we use pre-reflective
"ordinary common sense" and other cognitive-simplifying devices
such as heuristic reasoning14 in unconscious responses to events both
in everyday life and in the legal process.
The practicing bar, courts, legislatures, professional psychiatric
Olmstead v. L.C.) Anything More than "Idiot Wind?," 35 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 235, 236
(2001-02).
12 See, e.g., DAVID ROTHMAN & SHEILA ROTHMAN, THE WILLOWBROOK WARS 188-89
(1984) (discussing role of paradigmatically liberal Congresswoman Elizabeth Holtzman in
attempting to block group homes for the mentally retarded from opening in her district).
13 Cf. J. Michael Bailey & Richard Pillard, Are Some People Born Gay?, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 17, 1991), at A21 (arguing that homophobia is the only form of bigotry that can be so
expressed).
14 For example, I explain how these approaches have distorted our insanity defense
policies in Michael L. Perlin, Unpacking the Myths: The Symbolism Mythology of Insanity
Defense Jurisprudence, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 599 (1989-90) (Perlin, Myths), and
Michael L. Perlin, Psychodynamics and the Insanity Defense: "Ordinary Common Sense"
and Heuristic Reasoning, 69 NEB. L. REv. 3 (1990) (Perlin, OCS); see generally MICHAEL
L. PERLIN, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE INSANITY DEFENSE (1994). I explain how they
have distorted our approaches on questions of patient sexuality in Michael L. Perlin, Hos-
pitalized Patients and the Right to Sexual Interaction: Beyond the Last Frontier?, 20 NYU
REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 302 (1993-94) (Perlin, Sexual Interaction); Michael L. Perlin
"Make Promises by the Hour": Sex, Drugs, the ADA, and Psychiatric Hospitalization, 46
DEPAUL L. REV. 947 (1997) (Perlin, Promises). I explain how they have distorted our
approaches on questions of criminal competencies in Perlin, Pretexts, supra note 6; Michael
L. Perlin, "Dignity Was the First to Leave": Godinez v. Moran, Colin Ferguson, and the
Trial of Mentally Disabled Criminal Defendants, 14 BEHAV. Scl. & L. 61 (1996) (Perlin,
Dignity); Michael L. Perlin, "For the Misdemeanor Outlaw": The Impact of the ADA on the
Institutionalization of Criminal Defendants with Mental Disabilities, 52 ALA. L. REV. 193
(2000) (Perlin, Misdemeanor Outlaw). I explain how they have distorted our approaches in
death penalty cases in Michael L. Perlin, The Sanist Lives of Jurors in Death Penalty Cases:
The Puzzling Role of "Mitigating" Mental Disability Evidence, 8 NOTRE DAME J. L., ETH-
ICS & PUB. POL. 239 (1994); Michael L. Perlin, "The Executioner's Face Is Always Well-
Hidden ": The Role of Counsel and the Courts in Determining Who Dies, 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L.
REV. 201 (1996); Michael L. Perlin, "Life Is in Mirrors: Death Disappears": Giving Life to
Atkins, N.M. L. REV. (forthcoming 2003). I explain how they have distorted our ap-
proaches in right to refuse treatment cases in Michael L. Perlin & Deborah A. Dorfman, Is
It More Than "Dodging Lions and Wastin' Time"? Adequacy of Counsel, Questions of
Competence, and the Judicial Process in Individual Right to Refuse Treatment Cases, 2 Psy-
CHOLOGY, PUB. POL'Y & L.114 (1996); Michael L. Perlin, Decoding Right to Refuse Treat-
ment Law, 16 INT'L J. L. & PSYCHIATRY 151 (1993). I explain how they have distorted our
approaches in neonaticide cases in Michael L. Perlin, "She Breaks Just Like a Little Girl":
Neonaticide, The Insanity Defense, and the Irrelevance of "Ordinary Common Sense", WM.
& MARY J. WOMEN & L. (forthcoming 2003) (Perlin, Neonaticide).
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and psychological associations, and the scholarly academy are all
largely silent about sanism. A handful of practitioners, lawmakers,
scholars and judges have raised lonely voices, 15 but the topic is simply
"off the agenda" for most of these groups. 16 As a result, individuals
with mental disabilities - "the voiceless, those persons traditionally
isolated from the majoritarian democratic political system" 17 - are
frequently marginalized to an even greater extent than are others who
15 The most important recent case is In the Matter of the Mental Health of K.G.F., 29
P. 3d 485 (Mont. 2001). See infra text accompanying notes 35-66. See also, e.g., City of
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 454 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring)
(mentally retarded individuals subjected to "history of unfair and often grotesque mistreat-
ment" (quoting Cleburne Living Center, Inc. v. City of Cleburne, Texas, 726 F. 2d 191, 197
(5th Cir. 1974) (decision below)), and id. at 461 (Marshall, J., concurring in part & dissent-
ing in part) ("virulence and bigotry" of state-mandated segregation of the institutionalized
mentally retarded "rivaled, and indeed paralleled, the worst excesses of Jim Crow"); David
Bazelon, Institutionalization, Deinstitutionalization, and the Adversary Process, 75 COLUM.
L. REV. 897 (1975); Martha Minow, When Difference Has Its Home: Group Homes for the
Mentally Retarded, Equal Protection and Legal Treatment of Difference, 22 HARV. C.R. -
C.L. L. REV. 22 (1987).
For recent scholarly considerations of sanism, see, e.g., PETER BLANCK, THE AMERI-
CANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT AND THE EMERGING WORKFORCE: EMPLOYMENT OF PEO-
PLE WITH MENTAL RETARDATION 59-60 (1998); Justine Dunlap, Mental Health Advance
Directives: Having One's Say, 89 Ky. L.J. 327, 353 (200-01); Bryan Dupler, The Uncommon
Law: Insanity, Executions, and Oklahoma Criminal Procedure, 55 OKLA. L. REV. 1, 63
(2002); Sana Loue, The Involuntary Civil Commitment of Mentally Ill Persons in the United
States and Romania, 23 J. LEG. MED. 211, 235 n.120 (2002); Grant Morris, Defining Dan-
gerousness: Risking a Dangerous Definition, 10 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 61, 98 (1999);
Christopher Slobogin, An End to Insanity: Recasting the Role of Mental Disability in Crimi-
nal Cases, 86 VA. L. REV. 1199, 1244 (2000); Winiviere Sy, The Right of Institutionalized
Disabled Patients to Engage in Consensual Sexual Activity, 23 WHITTIER L. REV. 541, 549
(2001); Bruce Winick, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Civil Commitment Hearing, 10 J.
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES. 37, 41 (1999). I am gratified that student authors are also begin-
ning to examine sanism's pernicious effects. See, e.g., Sara Bredemeier, Note, Hollow Vdr-
dict: Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity Provokes Animusbased Discrimination in the Social
Security Act, 31 ST. MARY'S L.J. 697, 730 (2000); Eva Subotnik, Note, Past Violence, Future
Danger?: Rethinking Diminished Capacity Departures under Federal Sentencing Guidelines
Section 5k2.13, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1340, 1369 n.189 (2002); Elisa Swanson, Note, "Killers
Start Sad and Crazy ": Mental Illness and the Betrayal of Kipland Kinkel, 79 OR. L. REV.
1081, 1103-10 (2001).
16 Judicial hostility is commonplace. See, e.g., PERLIN, HIDDEN PREJUDICE, supra note
2, at 34-35, 63-64; Michael L. Perlin, A Law of Healing, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 407, 420 n.94
(2000):
[No example of judicial hostility] is perhaps as chilling as the following story: Some-
time after the trial court's decision in Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131 (D.N.J.
1978) (granting involuntarily committed mental patients a limited right to refuse
medication), I had occasion to speak to a state court trial judge about the Rennie
case. He asked me, "Michael, do you know what I would have done had you brought
Rennie before me?" (the Rennie case was litigated by counsel in the N.J. Division of
Mental Health Advocacy; I was director of the Division at that time). I replied,
"No," and he then answered, "I'd've taken the sonofabitch behind the courthouse
and had him shot."
17 Perlin, supra note 5, at 375-76.
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fit within the Carolene Products definition of "discrete and insular
minorities." 18
At its base, sanism is irrational. Any investigation of the roots or
sources of mental disability jurisprudence must factor in society's irra-
tional mechanisms for dealing with mentally disabled individuals. The
entire legal system makes assumptions about persons with mental dis-
abilities - who they are, how they got that way, what makes them
different, what there is about them that lets us treat them differently,
and whether their conditions are immutable. These assumptions re-
flect our fears and apprehensions about mental disability, persons
with mental disability, and the possibility that we ourselves may be-
come mentally disabled. 19 The most important question of all - why
do we feel the way we do about these people? - is rarely asked. 20
These conflicts compel an inquiry about the extent to which social
science data does (or should) inform the development of mental disa-
bility law jurisprudence. After all, if we agree that mentally disabled
18 1 discuss United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938), more
broadly in this context in Michael L. Perlin, State Constitutions and Statutes as Sources of
Rights for the Mentally Disabled: The Last Frontier, 20 Lov. L.A. L. REV. 249, 1250-51
(1987).
The Americans with Disabilities Act cites this very language in its findings section. On
the question of whether this will be viewed merely as a hortatory aspiration or as a Con-
gressional command for authentic behavioral and societal change, see Perlin, Promises,
supra note 14, at 958-60; Michael L. Perlin, "I Ain't Gonna Work on Maggie's Farm No
More": Institutional Segregation, Community Treatment, the A DA, and the Promise of Olm-
stead v. L.C., 17 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 53 (2000) (Perlin, Maggie's); Perlin, Misdemeanor
Outlaw, supra note 14; Michael L. Perlin, "Their Promises of Paradise": Institutional Segre-
gation, Community Treatment, the ADA, and Olmstead v. L.C., 37 Hous. L. REV. 999
(2000) (Perlin, Paradise).
19 See, e.g., Joseph Goldstein & Jay Katz, Abolish the "Insanity Defense" - Why Not?
72 YALE L.J. 853, 868-69 (1963); Michael L. Perlin, Competency, Deinstitutionalization, and
Homelessness: A Story of Marginalization, 28 Hous. L. REV. 63, 108 (1991) (on society's
fears of persons with mental disabilities), and id. at 93 n. 174 ("[W]hile race and sex are
immutable, we all can become mentally ill, homeless, or both. Perhaps this illuminates the
level of virulence we experience here.") (emphasis in original). On the way that public
fears about the purported link between mental illness and dangerousness "drive the formal
laws and policies governing mental disability jurisprudence," see John Monahan, Mental
Disorder and Violent Behavior: Perceptions and Evidence, 47 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 511, 511
(1992). See generally MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, Ex-
CLUSION AND AMERICAN LAW (1990); SANDER GILMAN, DIFFERENCE AND PATHOLOGY:
STEREOTYPES OF SEXUALITY, RACE AND MADNESS (1985).
20 See PERLIN, supra note 14, at 6-7 (asking this question). Compare Carmel Rogers,
Proceedings Under the Mental Health Act 1992: The Legalisation of Psychiatry, 1994 N.Z.
L.J. 404, 408 ("Because the preserve of psychiatry is populated by 'the mad' and 'the
loonies,' we do not really want to look at it too closely - it is too frightening and maybe
contaminated").
On the ways that stigma affects psychiatrists and medical students, see Howard
Dichter, The Stigmatization of Psychiatrists Who Work with Chronically Mentally Ill Per-
sons, in STIGMA, supra note 4, at 203; Leah Dickstein & Lisa Hinz, The Stigma of Mental
Illness for Medical Students and Residents, in STIGMA, supra note 4, at 153.
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individuals can be treated differently (because of their mental disabil-
ity, or because of behavioral characteristics that flow from that disabil-
ity), 21 it would appear logical that this difference in legal treatment is
- or should be - founded on some sort of empirical data base that
confirms both the existence and the causal role of such difference.
Yet, we tend to ignore, subordinate or trivialize behavioral research in
this area, especially when acknowledging that such research would be
cognitively dissonant with our intuitive (albeit empirically flawed)
views.22 And the steady stream of publication of new, comprehensive
research does not promise any change in society's attitudes. 23
II. SANIST LAWYERS AND SANIST COURTS
A. Sanist Lawyers24
Twenty years ago, in a survey of the role of counsel in cases in-
volving individuals with mental disabilities, Dr. Robert L. Sadoff and I
observed:
Traditional, sporadically-appointed counsel . . . were unwilling to
pursue necessary investigations, lacked . . . expertise in mental
health problems, and suffered from "rolelessness," stemming from
near total capitulation to experts, hazily defined concepts of success/
failure, inability to generate professional or personal interest in the
patient's dilemma, and lack of a clear definition of the proper advo-
cacy function. As a result, counsel.., functioned "as no more than a
clerk, ratifying the events that transpired, rather than influencing
them."2 5
Commitment hearings were meaningless rituals, serving only to
provide a false coating of respectability to illegitimate proceedings;26
in one famous survey, lawyers were so bad that a patient had a better
chance to be released at a commitment hearing if he or she appeared
21 On the Supreme Court's confusion over the meaning of "mental disorder," see 1
PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW, supra note 2, § 2A-3.3, at 75-92 (2d ed. 1998), discuss-
ing Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997) (upholding Kansas' Sexually Violent Predator
Act).
22 See generally J. Alexander Tanford, The Limits of a Scientific Jurisprudence: The
Supreme Court and Psychology, 66 IND. L.J. 137 (1990).
23 For the most comprehensive research on predictions of violence, for example, see
John Monahan, Clinical and Actuarial Predictions of Violence, in MODERN SCIENTIFIC Evi-
DENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY §§7-2.0 to 7-2.4, at 300 (David
Faigman et al. eds., 1997).
24 This section is generally adapted from PERLIN, HIDDEN PREJUDICE, supra note 2, at
55-56.
25 Michael L. Perlin & Robert L. Sadoff, Ethical Issues in the Representation of Individ-
uals in the Commitment Process, 45 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 161, 164 (Summer 1982)
(footnotes omitted).
26 Virginia Hiday, The Attorney's Role in Involuntary Civil Commitment, 60 N.C. L.
REV. 1027, 1030 (1982).
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pro se.27 Merely educating lawyers about psychiatric techniques and
psychological nomenclature did not materially improve lawyers' per-
formance because lawyers' attitudes remained unchanged. 28 Counsel
was especially substandard in cases involving mentally disabled crimi-
nal defendants.29
In the past two decades, the myth has developed that organized,
specialized and aggressive counsel is now available to mentally dis-
abled individuals in commitment, institutionalization and release mat-
ters. The availability of such counsel is largely illusory; in many
jurisdictions, the level of representation remains almost uniformly
substandard, 30 and, even within the same jurisdiction, the provision of
counsel can be "wildly inconsistent."'3 1 Without the presence of effec-
tive counsel, substantive mental disability law reform recommenda-
tions may turn into "an empty shell. ''32 Representation of mentally
disabled individuals falls far short of even the most minimal model of
"client-centered counseling. '33 What is worse, few courts even seem
to notice. 34
27 Elliot Andalman & David Chambers, Effective Counsel for Persons Facing Civil
Commitment: A Survey, a Polemic, and a Proposal, 45 Miss. L.J. 43, 72 (1974).
28 Norman Poythress, Psychiatric Expertise in Civil Commitment: Training Attorneys to
Cope With Expert Testimony, 2 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 1, 15 (1978). See infra text accompa-
nying notes 152-54.
29 DAVID BAZELON, QUESTIONING AUTHORITY: JUSTICE AND CRIMINAL LAW 49
(1988); See Perlin, Myths, supra note 17, at 654. A survey conducted by Harvard Medical
School revealed that the "great majority" of defense counsel interviewed were unaware of
the operative criteria for competency to stand trial. 4 PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILrrv LAW,
supra note 2, § 8A-4.3 at 60 (citing study). For a particularly shocking example of poor
counsel in a death penalty case involving a mentally disabled criminal defendant, see Al-
vord v. Wainwright, 469 U.S. 956 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
30 See Michael L. Perlin, Fatal Assumption: A Critical Evaluation of the Role of Counsel
in Mental Disability Cases, 16 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 39, 49-52 (1992).
31 Perlin & Dorfman, supra note 14, at 122.
32 Id. at 121.
33 The standard text is DAVID BINDER & SUSAN PRICE, LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND
COUNSELING: A CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH (1977), updated in DAVID A. BINDER,
PAUL BERGMAN & SUSAN C. PRICE, LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS: A CLIENT CENTERED
APPROACH (1991). Compare Stephen Ellmann, Lawyers and Clients, 34 UCLA L. REV.
717 (1987) (critiquing Binder's and Price's work).
34 See, e.g., In re C.P.K., 516 So.2d 1323, 1325 (La. Ct. App. 1987) (discussed in Perlin
& Dorfman, supra note 14, at 120 n.67) (reversing commitment order where trial court did
not comply with statute expressing explicit preference for representation by state Mental
Health Advocacy Service, and rejecting as "untenable" the argument that trial court
should be excused "since it did not know ... whether the Service really existed"). But cf,
State ex rel. Memmel v. Mundy, 75 Wis.2d 276, 249 N.W. 2d 573 (1977) (setting out duties
of adversary counsel in involuntary civil commitment cases).
There is now some empirical data suggesting that patients represented by public de-
fender organizations generally obtain significantly more favorable outcomes in contested
involuntary civil commitment cases than do patients represented by private counsel hired
on short-term contracts. Mary Durham & John La Fond, The Impact of Expanding a State's
Therapeutic Commitment Authority, in THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: THE LAW AS A
[Vol. 9:683
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B. The Significance of K.G.F.
One court that has noticed is the Montana Supreme Court. In In
the Matter of the Mental Health of K.G.E.,35 that court dramatically
launched a rewriting of this area of the law. K.G.F. was a voluntary
patient at a community hospital in Montana, whose expressed desire
to leave the facility prompted a state petition alleging her need for
commitment. 36 Counsel was appointed, and a commitment hearing
was scheduled for the next day. The state's expert recommended com-
mitment; patient's counsel presented the testimony of the plaintiff
herself and a mental health professional who recommended that the
patient be kept in the hospital a few days so that a community-based
treatment plan could be arranged nearer to her home. 37 The court
ordered commitment. K.G.F.'s appeal was premised, in part, on alle-
gations of ineffective assistance of counsel. 38
In a thoughtful and scholarly opinion, the Montana Supreme
Court relied on state statutory and constitutional sources to find that
"the right to counsel.., provides an individual subject to an involun-
tary commitment proceeding the right to effective assistance of coun-
sel. In turn, this right affords the individual with the right to raise the
allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel in challenging a commit-
ment order. '39 In assessing what constitutes "effectiveness," the court
- startlingly, to my mind - eschewed the Strickland v. Washington
standard 40 (used to assess effectiveness in criminal cases) as insuffi-
ciently protective of the "liberty interests of individuals such as
K.G.F., who may or may not have broken any law, but who, upon the
expiration of a 90-day commitment, must indefinitely bear the badge
of inferiority of a once 'involuntarily committed' person with a proven
mental disorder. '41 Interestingly, one of the key reasons why Strick-
land was seen as lacking was the court's conclusion that "reasonable
professional assistance" 42 - the linchpin of the Strickland decision -
"cannot be presumed in a proceeding that routinely accepts - and
even requires - an unreasonably low standard of legal assistance and
THERAPEUTIC AGENT 121, 122 (David Wexler ed., 1990) (THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE);
Mary Durham & John La Fond, The Empirical and Policy Implications of Broadening the
Statutory Criteria for Civil Commitment, 3 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 395 (1985).
35 306 Mont. 1, 29 P.3d 485 (2001).
36 Id. at 488.
37 Id.
38 Id. at 489.
39 Id. at 491.
40 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (establishing weak effectiveness of counsel standard). See gener-
ally 1 PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW, supra note 2, § 2B-11.1.
41 K.G.F., 29 P.3d at 491.
42 See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.
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generally disdains zealous, adversarial confrontation. '43
In assessing the contours of effective assistance of counsel, the
court emphasized that it was not limiting its inquiry to courtroom per-
formance: Even more important was counsel's "failure to fully investi-
gate and comprehend a patient's circumstances prior to an involuntary
civil commitment hearing or trial, which may, in turn, lead to critical
decision-making between counsel and client as to how best to pro-
ceed."'44 Such pre-hearing matters, the court continued, "clearly in-
volve effective preparation prior to a hearing or trial. ' 45 The court
further stressed state laws guaranteeing the patient's "dignity and per-
sonal integrity '46 and "privacy and dignity" 47 as a basis for its deci-
sion; "'[q]uality counsel provides the most likely way - perhaps the
only likely way' to ensure the due process protection of dignity and
privacy interests in cases such as the one at bar."'48
After noting that the focus of its condemnation was not assigned
counsel in the case before it (but rather "the failure of the system as a
whole that through the ordinary course of the efficient administration
of a legal process threatens to supplant an individual's due process
rights"),49 the court again focused on the issue of dignity, quoting an
article by Professor Bruce Winick:
Perhaps nothing can threaten a person's belief that he or she is an
equal member of society as much as being subjected to a civil com-
mitment hearing" and when "legal proceedings do not treat people
with dignity, they feel devalued as members of society."'50
The court continued by considering the issues of prejudice, stere-
otyping, and stigma,51 and specifically held that even pejorative lan-
guage - the court here quoted a 1977 state Supreme Court case that
had referred to persons with disabilities as "idiots and lunatics" 52 -
was "repugnant to our state constitution. ' 53 Having set out this legal
framework, the court observed that state statutes offered "little assis-
43 K.G.F., 29 P.3d at 492 (citing Perlin, supra note 30, at 53-54 (identifying Strickland
standard as "sterile and perfunctory" where "reasonably effective assistance" is objectively
measured by the "prevailing professional norms")).
44 K.G.F., 29 P.3d at 492.
45 Id.
46 Id. at 493 (quoting MONT. CODE ANN. §53-21-101(1)).
47 Id. at 493 (quoting MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-21-141(1)); see also MoNT. CONST. art.
II, § 4 ("the dignity of the human being is inviolable"). See generally Perlin, Dignity, supra
note 14.
48 Id. at 494 (citing Perlin, supra note 30, at 47).
49 Id. at 494.
50 Id. at 495 (quoting Winick, supra note 15, at 44-45).
51 Id. at 495-96 (quoting Perlin, supra note 5, at 374; Winick, supra note 15, at 45).
52 Id. at 495 (quoting Matter of Sonsteng, 175 Mont. 307, 573 P.2d 1149, 1153 (1977)).
53 Id. at 495.
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tance" in determining the scope of "effective counsel," 54 and thus
sought to give depth to the terse statutory language.
"At a bare minimum," the court observed, "counsel should pos-
sess a verifiably competent understanding of the legal process of in-
voluntary commitments, as well as the range of alternative, less
restrictive treatment and care options available. ' 55 In the initial inves-
tigation, counsel must "conduct a thorough review of all available
records,... necessarily involv[ing] the patient's prior medical history
and treatment, if and to what extent medication has played a role in
the petition for commitment, the patient's relationship to family and
friends within the community, and the patient's relationship with all
relevant medical professionals involved prior to and during the peti-
tion process. '56
Also, counsel should be prepared to discuss with his or her client
"the available options in light of such investigations," as well as the
"practical and legal consequences of those options. '5 7 It is "impera-
tive," the court stressed, "that counsel request a reasonable amount of
time for such an investigation prior to the hearing or trial on the peti-
tion."'58 Moreover, counsel "should also attempt to interview all per-
sons who have knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the
commitment petition, including family members, acquaintances and
any other persons identified by the client as having relevant informa-
tion, and be prepared to call such persons as witnesses. 59
After similarly elaborating on counsel's role in the client inter-
view and the need to insure that the patient understands the scope of
the right to remain silent,60 the court concluded by underscoring coun-
sel's responsibilities "as an advocate and adversary."'6' The lawyer
must "represent the perspective of the [patient] and ...serve as a
vigorous advocate for the [patient's] wishes, ' 62 "engaging in "all as-
pects of advocacy and vigorously argu[ing] to the best of his or her
ability for the ends desired by the client, ' 63 and operating on the "pre-
sumption that a client wishes to not be involuntarily committed. 64
Thus, "evidence that counsel independently advocated or otherwise
54 Id. at 497.
55 Id. at 498.
56 Id.
57 Id. (quoting National Center for State Courts' Guidelines for Involuntary Civil Com-
mitment, 10 MErN. & PHYS. Dis. LAw Rt-TR., 409, 465 (Part E2) (1986) (Guidelines)).
58 Id. at 498.
59 Id. at 498-99.
60 Id. at 499-500.
61 Id. at 500.
62 Id. at 500 (quoting Guidelines, supra note 57, Part E2, at 465).
63 Id. at 500 (quoting id., Part F5, at 483).
64 Id. at 500.
Spring 2003]
CLINICAL LAW REVIEW
acquiesced to an involuntary commitment - in the absence of any
evidence of a voluntary and knowing consent by the patient-respon-
dent - will establish the presumption that counsel was ineffective.
65
In conclusion, the court stated:
It is not only counsel for the patient-respondent, but also courts,
that are charged with the duty of safeguarding the due process
rights of individuals involved at every stage of the proceedings, and
must therefore rigorously adhere to the standards expressed herein,
as well as those mandated under [state statute].66
Although, on one hand, K.G.F. provides an easily transferable
blueprint for courts that want to grapple with adequacy of counsel
issues in this context but are reluctant to explore totally uncharted
waters, the decision remains the exception to the usual practice.
Counsel's failure here still appears to be inevitable, given the bar's
abject disregard of both consumer groups (made up predominantly of
former recipients, both voluntary and involuntary, of mental disability
services) and mentally disabled individuals, many of whom have writ-
ten carefully, thoughtfully and sensitively about these issues. 67 This
inadequacy further reflects sanist practices on the part of the lawyers
representing persons with mental disabilities, as well as the political
entities vested with the authority to hire such counsel. Although a
handful of articulate scholars take this question seriously, 68 the ques-
tions raised here do not appear to be a priority agenda item for liti-
gators or for most academics writing in this area.
65 Id.
66 Id. at 501.
67 On the involvement of consumer groups in important patients' rights litigation, see 1
PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW, supra note 2, §1-2.1, at 10 n.43; Michael L. Perlin,
"Things Have Changed:" Looking at Non-Institutional Mental Disability Law Through the
Sanism Filter, 46 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2002-03). See generally Challenging the
Therapeutic State: Critical Perspectives on Psychiatry and the Mental Health System, 11 J.
MIND & BEHAV. 1-328 (1990) (symposium issue). See generally infra note 88.
68 See, e.g., Joshua Cook, Good Lawyering and Bad Role Models: The Role of Respon-
dent's Counsel in a Civil Commitment Hearing, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHics 179 (2000); Stan-
ley Herr, The Future of Advocacy for Persons with Mental Disabilities, 39 RUTGERS L.
REV.. 443 (1987); Stanley Herr, Representation of Clients with Disabilities: Issues of Ethics
and Control, 17 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 609 (1991); Peter Margulies, "Who Are
You To Tell Me That?" Attorney-Client Deliberation Regarding Nonlegal Issues and the
Interests of Nonclients, 68 N.C. L. REV. 213 (1990); Paul Tremblay, On Persuasion and
Paternalism: Lawyer Decisionmaking and the Questionably Competent Client, 1987 UTAH
L. REV. 515; Steven Schwartz, Damage Actions as a Strategy for Enhancing the Quality of
Care of Persons with Mental Disabilities, 17 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 657 (1989-
1990); Christopher Slobogin & Amy Mashburn, The Criminal Defense Lawyer's Fiduciary
Duty to Clients with Mental Disabilities, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1581 (2000). See also Perlin,
supra note 30, at 58-59 (recommending research agenda on this issue).
[Vol. 9:683
Sanism in Clinical Teaching
C. Sanism and Legal Representation
Sanism permeates the legal representation process both in cases
in which mental capacity is a central issue, and those in which such
capacity is a collateral question. Sanist lawyers (1) distrust their men-
tally disabled clients, (2) trivialize their complaints, (3) fail to forge
authentic attorney-client relationships with such clients and reject
their clients' potential contributions to case-strategizing, and (4) take
less seriously case outcomes that are adverse to their clients. I will
address each of these factors. 69
1. Distrust of the Client
One of the basic building blocks of mental disability law is the
principle that incompetence cannot be presumed either because of
mental illness or because of a past record or history of institutionaliza-
tion.70 Furthermore, there is "no necessary relationship between
mental illness and incompetency which renders [mentally ill persons]
unable to provide informed consent to medical treatment. '' 71 As
stated forcefully by the New York Court of Appeals:
We conclude however, that neither the fact that appellants are
69 Certainly, many lawyers distrust and trivialize their non-mentally disabled clients as
well. I believe, however, that the problems here are magnified for several overlapping
reasons:
" It remains socially acceptable to treat persons with mental disabilities this way, at a
time when we are, finally, becoming more enlightened about our sorry history of
trivialization and disparagement of other minority groups.
" There are robust specialized bars and well-funded special interest groups willing to
"go to bat" for members of other minority groups when their personhood is dimin-
ished by callous lawyers.
" The potential outcome of some mental disability cases - the way, for instance, that
defendants on whom an insanity defense is imposed may spend far longer in maxi-
mum security custody than if they been convicted of the underlying criminal
charges, see, e.g., PERLIN, supra note 14, at 110-11 - makes the issues here even
more problematic.
70 See, e.g., In re LaBelle, 107 Wash.2d 196, 728 P.2d 138, 146 (1986); Perlin & Dorf-
man, supra note 14, at 210; Bruce Winick, The MacArthur Treatment Competence Study:
Legal and Therapeutic Implications, 2 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL'Y & L. 137, 151 n.80 (1996). See
also Slobogin & Mashburn, supra note 68, at 1602, discussing the work of Professor Elyn
Saks (see Elyn Saks, Competency to Refuse Treatment, 69 N.C. L. REV. 945, 948-61 (1991)):
Professor Saks argues that requiring any degree of rationality beyond that demanded
by the basic rationality standard is inappropriate, in light of the "pervasive influence
of the irrational and the unconscious" in everyone's decision-making process. As she
notes, "[p]sychiatrists and psychologists have demonstrated convincingly the ever-
present influence of primitive hopes, wishes, and fears on the mental lives of us all."
Under a heightened rationality test (as opposed to a "basic rationality" test), too
many decisions would be considered incompetent. (footnotes omitted).
71 Davis v. Hubbard, 506 F. Supp. 915, 935 (N.D. Ohio 1980); Perlin, supra note 19, at
113-14; Bruce J. Winick, Competency to Consent to Treatment: The Distinction Between
Assent and Objection, 28 Hous. L. REV. 15 (1991).
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mentally ill nor that they have been involuntarily committed, with-
out more, constitutes a sufficient basis to conclude that they lack the
mental capacity to comprehend the consequences of their decision
to refuse medication that poses a significant risk to their physical
wellbeing.72
This reasoning is supported by the most important contemporary
research. Publications by the MacArthur Foundation's Network on
Mental Health and the Law dramatically conclude that mental pa-
tients are not always incompetent to make rational decisions and that
mental patients are not inherently more incompetent than patients
who are not mentally ill. 73 In fact, on "any given measure of deci-
sional abilities, the majority of patients with schizophrenia did not
perform more poorly than other patients and non-patients. 74
In short, the presumption in which courts have regularly engaged
- that there is both a de facto and de jure presumption of incompe-
tency to be applied to medication decision making75 - appears to be
based on an empirical fallacy. Yet, lawyers distrust their clients with
mental disabilities, both in cases in which mental disability is a central
issue, and in those in which it is collateral. Lawyers assume, for exam-
ple, that a criminal defendant with mental disabilities is not competent
to decide whether to plead insanity or another fact-based defense.76
Such lawyers apply an equivalent assumption of incompetency when
representing civil clients with mental disabilities,77 and that assump-
tion certainly rears its head if the client is institutionalized. 78 Like
72 Rivers v. Katz, 67 N.Y.2d 485, 495 N.E.2d 337, 504 N.Y.S.2d 79 (1986).
73 Thomas Grisso & Paul S. Appelbaum, The MacArthur Treatment Competence Study
(III): Abilities of Patients To Consent to Psychiatric and Medical Treatments, 19 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 149 (1995) (discussed in Perlin & Dorfman, supra note 14, at 120).
74 Grisso & Appelbaum, supra note 73, at 169.
75 On this presumption in general, see Winick, supra note 70.
76 See, e.g., State v. Khan, 175 N.J.Super. 72, 417 A.2d 585 (App. Div. 1980) (when
Public Defender heard Khan discuss "crazy" ideas, he insisted that Khan plead insanity,
notwithstanding Khan's fact-based claim of self-defense) (I served as Khan's lawyer on
appeal). Compare Slobogin & Mashburn, supra note 68, at 1631 (in more than one-third of
insanity defense cases studied, "the attorneys appeared to have pre-empted their clients'
participation in the decision-making process") (quoting Richard Bonnie et al., Decision-
Making in Criminal Defense: An Empirical Study of Insanity Pleas and the Impact of
Doubted Client Competence, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY. 48, 57 (1996)).
77 See Perlin, Maggie's, supra note 18, at 63 n.78 (citing sources).
78 See Perlin & Dorfman, supra note 14, at 134 ("Ward psychiatrists demonstrate a
propensity to equate incompetent with makes bad decisions and to assume, in face of statu-
tory and case law, that incompetence in decision making can be presumed from the fact of
institutionalization"); Brian Ladds et al., The Disposition of Criminal Charges After Invol-
untary Medication to Restore Competency to Stand Trial, 38 J. FORENS. ScI. 1442 (1993);
Brian Ladds et al., Involuntary Medication of Patients Who Are Incompetent to Stand Trial:
A Descriptive Study of the New York Experience with Judicial Review, 21 BULL. AM. ACAD.
PSYCHIATRY & L. 529 (1993). See also Dunlap, supra note 15, at 353 ("'healthful deci-
sion[making]' is not required of persons who are not mentally ill").
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mental health professionals, these lawyers treat their clients as "pa-
tients that are sick." 79
The attitudes displayed by such lawyers are echoed in some case
law. On the question of the procedures to be employed in determining
whether a witness is competent to testify, the influential case of Sin-
clair v. Wainwright80 set out the controlling legal standards as follows:
If a patient in a mental institution is offered as a witness, an oppos-
ing party may challenge competency, whereupon it becomes the
duty of the court to make such an examination as will satisfy the
court of the competency of the proposed witness. Shuler v. Wain-
wright, 491 F.2d 1213, [1223-24] (5th Cir. 1974). And if the chal-
lenged testimony is crucial, critical or highly significant, failure to
conduct an appropriate competency hearing implicates due process
concerns of fundamental fairness.
The assumption that institutionalization ought inevitably lead to a
competency challenge is seriously flawed, as demonstrated by the rele-
vant valid and reliable scientific research. 81 Yet, it is clear that some
courts, at least, will continue to follow this doctrine, sub silentio, espe-
cially in criminal cases.
2. Trivialization of the Client's Complaints
Clients often have complaints. They complain about the way a
case is progressing, the impact the litigation is having on their life, and
a plethora of other matters, many of which are only tangentially con-
nected to the lawyer-client relationship.
If a presumably mentally competent client complains to a lawyer,
we can expect (or at least hope) that the lawyer will take the com-
plaint relatively seriously, if for no other reason than that the failure
to do so may trigger a disciplinary investigation. But if the client has a
mental disability - or is perceived as having a mental disability -
such complaints are often trivialized, ignored, or mocked.
How do I know this? For the thirty-plus years that I have been a
member of the bar, devoting my practice and consultation almost ex-
clusively to issues of mental disability law, I have witnessed such be-
havior and heard such comments by countless lawyers, many of whom
(e.g., criminal defense lawyers, civil legal aid lawyers) should know
better (if for no other reason than that they regularly represent clients
whose problems are not taken seriously by a large segment of society).
I have no empirical data to share at this point, but can estimate -
79 BRUCE ARRIGO, PUNISHING THE MENTALLY ILL: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF LAW
AND PSYCHIATRY 29-30 (2002).
80 814 F.2d 1516, 1522-1523 (11th Cir. 1987) (citation omitted).
81 See supra text accompanying notes 73-75.
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with absolute confidence - that hundreds of lawyers have expressed
this view to me over the years. Clients with mental disabilities are
seen as an annoyance, and their problems are simply not as "impor-
tant" as are the problems of others. 82
3. Effects on the Lawyer-Client Relationship
If lawyers do not take the clients or their legal problems seri-
ously, the lawyers probably will not forge the sort of attorney-client
relationship that is the aspirational goal of law practice. Certainly,
doubting your client's competence (and/or veracity) and trivializing
your client's complaints will not advance the building of such a rela-
tionship. Because persons with mental disabilities are trivialized as
persons,83 and the essence of their basic humanity is often ques-
tioned, 84 an adverse case outcome is simply not taken as seriously as it
would be if the client were perceived to be mentally competent.
In problematic attorney-client relationships of this sort, lawyers
will be prone to dismiss or ignore the client's view about the course of
litigation, including, for example, the selection of a theory of the case,
pre-trial discovery, case strategizing, choice of witnesses, structuring
of cross-examination, and choice of remedy. Such suggestions are
rarely taken seriously. There is some relevant criminal procedure case
law on the right of a competent criminal defendant to refuse to plead
82 Perhaps I should be more charitable and acknowledge that these lawyers at least had
the awareness to reach out and discuss the underlying issues with a colleague specializing
in this area of the law. And I am grateful for that. Nonetheless, the rhetoric that is so often
used ("Hey, Michael, I am representing a real whacko this time") suggests that I don't have
to be that charitable.
83 Compare HENRY STEADMAN & JOSEPH COCOZZA, CAREERS OF THE CRIMINALLY
INSANE (1974).
84 See Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1101-02 (E.D. Wis. 1971), vac'd & re-
manded on other grounds, 414 U.S. 473 (1974):
[The] conclusion [that due process is mandated at involuntary civil commitment
hearings] is fortified by medical evidence that indicates that patients respond more
favorably to treatment when they feel they are being treated fairly and are treated as
intelligent, aware, human beings.
See also Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781, 785 (M.D. Ala. 1971), affd sub nom.
Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974) ("To deprive any citizen of his or her
liberty upon the altruistic theory that confinement is for humane therapeutic reasons and
then fail to provide adequate treatment violates the very fundamentals of due process");
Rennie v. Klein, 476 F. Supp. 1294, 1306 (D. N.J. 1979), modified & remanded, 653 F.2d
836 (3d Cir. 1981), vac'd & remanded, 458 U.S. 1119 (1982) ("Schizophrenics have been
asked every question except, 'How does the medicine agree with you?' Their response is
worth listening to," quoting Van Putten & Roy, Subjective Response as a Predictor of Out-
come in Pharmacotherapy, 35 ARCH. GEN. PSYCHIATRY 477, 478-80 (1978)); Falter v. Vet-
erans Administration, 502 F. Supp. 1178, 1184 (D. N.J. 1980) ("When I say that they are
treated differently I am not referring to the substance of their medical or psychiatric treat-
ment, I am referring to how they are treated as human beings").
[Vol. 9:683
Sanism in Clinical Teaching
not guilty by reason of insanity.8 5 I have found no case law at all on
this issue in a civil litigation context, but I do not think that the ab-
sence of such case law signifies the absence of a problem.
Another voice that is typically ignored is that of "psychiatric sur-
vivor groups. ' 86 For at least 25 years, formerly-hospitalized individu-
als and their supporters have formed an important role in the reform
of the mental health system87and in test case litigation. 88 Yet, there is
85 See, e.g., Khan, 417 A.2d at 590. For a recent helpful review of all relevant cases, see
Martin Sabelli & Stacey Leyton, Train Wreck and Freeway Crashes: An Argument for Fair-
ness and Against Self-Representation in the Criminal Justice System, 91 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMI-
NOLOGY. 161, 172, 173 & n.28, 174 (2000). For a thoughtful consideration of the mentally
disabled client's autonomy in decision making in criminal cases, see Slobogin & Mashburn,
supra note 68, at 1627-36. See also Linda Fentiman, Whose Right Is It Anyway?: Rethinking
Competency to Stand Trial in Light of The Synthetically Sane Insanity Defendant, 40 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 1109, 1136-37 (1986):
Thus, the forcible medication of an insanity defendant with psychotropic drugs in
order to eliminate the most overt symptoms of his mental illness and make him
"competent" to stand trial violates his fundamental due process right to present a
defense, because of its impact on both his trial demeanor and his ability to actively
participate in the planning of trial strategy.
86 See generally www.narpa.org.
87 See, e.g., Jennifer Honig & Susan Fendell, Meeting The Needs of Female Trauma
Survivors: The Effectiveness of The Massachusetts Mental Health Managed Care System, 15
BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 161, 185 (2000), quoting Patricia Spindel & Jo Anne Nugent, The
Trouble with Pact: Questioning the Increasing Use of Assertive Community Treatment
Teams in Community Mental Health 2 <http://www.madnation.org/papcttrouble.htm> (cita-
tions omitted):
Psychiatric survivors are frequent critics of the mental health system's heavy reliance
on the biomedical approach: "For over twenty years, the biomedical approach has
been repeatedly criticized by psychiatric survivor groups and numerous authors, as
being too drug-oriented and too controlling."
88 In such cases, survivor groups generally have opposed the constitutionality or appli-
cation of involuntary civil commitment statutes, see, e.g., Project Release v. Prevost, 722
F.2d 960 (2d Cir. 1983), or supported the right of patients to refuse the involuntary admin-
istration of psychotropic drugs, see Rennie v. Klein, 653 F.2d 836, 838 (3d Cir. 1981) (Alli-
ance for the Liberation of Mental Patients, amicus curiae), but also have involved
themselves in a far broader range of litigation. See, e.g., Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157
(1986) (impact of severe mental disability on Miranda waiver; Coalition for the Fundamen-
tal Rights and Equality of Ex-patients, amicus). The involvement of such groups in test
case litigation-exercising the right of self-determination in an effort to control, to the
greatest extent possible, their own destinies, see, e.g., JUDI CHAMBERLIN, ON OUR OWN:
PATIENT-CONTROLLED ALTERNATIVES TO THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM (1979) - is a
major development that cannot be overlooked by participants in subsequent mental disa-
bility litigation. See Kenneth Byalin, Parent Empowerment: A Treatment Strategy for Hos-
pitalized Adolescents, 41 Hosp. & COMMUN. PSYCHIATRY 89 (1990); Herbert S. Cromwell,
Jr., et al., A Citizens' Coalition in Mental Health Advocacy: The Maryland Experience, 39
Hosp. & COMMUN. PSYCHIATRY 959 (1988) (discussing impact of citizens' groups on state
budgetary process); Marc Galanter, Zealous Self-Help Groups as Adjuncts to Psychiatric
Treatment A Study of Recovery, Inc., 145 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1248, 1253 (1988) (self-help
group assessed as providing "meaningful help" to severely distressed ex-patients); Neal
Milner, The Right to Refuse Treatment: Four Case Studies of Legal Mobilization, 21 LAW &
Soc'Y REV. 447 (1987) (discussing impact of ex-patient groups on course of right to refuse
treatment litigation); William Snavely, Mental Illness: NAMI's View, 39 HosP. & COMMUN.
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little evidence that these groups are taken seriously either by law-
yers89 or academics. 90
D. Ethical Issues9'
Even a cursory examination of the ethical issues permeating the
representation of persons with mental disabilities readily evidences
the omnipresence of sanism. To some extent, the fact that persons
with mental disabilities have always been significantly under-
represented in all phases of the legal process 92 has led to the relega-
tion of ethical issues to "the 'backburner' until other substantive and
procedural issues involving the right to representation 93 and the
means of providing such representation 94 are resolved more defini-
tively."'95 Also, because of the nature of the subject matter, "the issues
raised by investigating ethical standards in civil commitment represen-
tation may dredge up unconscious feelings which lead to avoidance -
by clients, by lawyers, and by judges - of the underlying problems. '96
It is likely that, as more persons with mental disabilities are afforded
diffuse legal representation, 97 the ethical issues will inevitably receive
PSYCHIATRY 994 (1988) (letter to the editor)(explaining position of National Alliance for
the Mentally Ill). The role of self-help groups is examined in detail in Howard Harp, Tak-
ing a New Approach to Independent Living, 44 Hosp. & COMMUN. PSYCHIATRY 413 (1993);
Peter Margulies, The Cognitive Politics of Professional Conflict: Law Reform, Mental
Health Treatment Technology, and Citizen Self-Governance, 5 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 25
(1992); Beth Tanzman, An Overview of Surveys of Mental Health Consumers' Preferences
for Housing and Support Services, 44 HosP. & COMMUN. PSYCHIATRY 450 (1993).
89 But see Francoise Boudreau, Partnership as a New Strategy in Mental Health Policy:
The Case of Quebec, 16 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 307, 319 (1991); Susan Stefan, The
Two Worlds of Psychiatric Disability: "Discredited," "Discreditable," and the Identities of
Disabled People, WM. & MARY L. REV. (forthcoming 2003).
90 One important exception is Shin Imai, A Counter-Pedagogy for Social Justice: Core
Skills for Community-based Lawyering, 9 CLIN. L. REV. 195, 199 (2002) (discussing Os-
goode Hall Law School's clinic's collaborative work with Parkdale Community Legal Ser-
vices in representing one such group). See also Tewksbury v. Dowling, 169 F. Supp. 2d 103
(E.D.N.Y. 2001), and Charles W. v. Maul, 214 F.3d 350 (2d Cir. 2000) (litigants represented
by Prof. William Brooks and the Mental Disability Law Clinic of Touro Law School).
91 This section is generally adapted from 1 PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW, supra
note 2, § 2B-8, at 227-29.
92 4 App., TASK PANEL REPORTS SUBMITTED TO THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON
MENTAL HEALTH 1353, 1366 (1978) (TASK PANEL REPORTS).
93 See, e.g., 1 PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW, supra note 2, §§ 2B-3 to 2B-3.2. But
see K.G.F, 29 P.3d at 492:
"[R]easonable professional assistance" cannot be presumed in a proceeding that rou-
tinely accepts - and even requires - an unreasonably low standard of legal assis-
tance and generally disdains zealous, adversarial confrontation.
94 See, e.g., 1 PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAw, §§ 2B-4.1 to 2B-6.
95 Perlin & Sadoff, supra note 25, at 163.
96 Id. See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin, Psychiatric Testimony in a Criminal Setting, 3 BULL.
AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 143, 147-48 (1975).
97 TASK PANEL REPORTS, supra note 92, at 1366-67.
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a fuller airing.98 But, because counsel's role traditionally has been so
murkily defined and because the underlying ethical problems have
been so widely ignored, the serious role and process conflicts 99 must
be considered in detail so that the specific ethical questions can be
addressed.'0o
E. Role of Counsel'0 1
Although the U.S. Supreme Court has articulated clearly the role
of counsel in criminal trials - "the constitutional requirement of sub-
stantial equality and fair process can only be attained where counsel
acts in the role of an active advocate on behalf of his client, as op-
posed to that of amicus curiae"10 2 - few courts10 3 have ever ex-
amined closely the role of counsel (and his or her commensurate
duties) in the civil commitment process or in the context of other rep-
resentation of individuals with mental disabilities. 104 Although courts
have acknowledged that there are substantial differences between
representation in a criminal action and a juvenile delinquency pro-
98 Perlin & Sadoff, supra note 25.
99 See 1 PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW, supra note 2, §§ 2B-8.2 to 2B-8.3.
100 Compare Samuel Jan Brakel, Legal Schizophrenia and the Mental Health Lawyer:
Recent Trends in Civil Commitment Litigation, 6 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 3, 4 (1988) (characteriz-
ing much of then-recent patients' rights litigation as suffering from "florid legal schizophre-
nia," reflecting "aimless hyperactivity and aggressiveness, under which human problems
are needlessly turned into legal battle, fought without regard to internal system costs, the
larger societal interests, or even the best interests of the client").
For a typically under-litigated and under-considered issue, compare Matter of Grimes,
193 Ill. App.3d 119, 549 N.E.2d 616 (App. 1990) (where record did not indicate whether
attorney had been appointed for involuntarily committed patient as of date that hearing
was scheduled, as statutorily required, or as of date of hearing, court deemed appointment
to have been made in compliance with statute) with Matter of Johnson, 191 Ill. App.3d 93,
546 N.E.2d 1176 (App. 1989) (commitment order reversed where trial judge appointed
counsel on date of hearing rather than on date when court selected hearing date).
101 This section is generally adapted from 1 PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW, supra
note 2, § 2B-8.1, at 229-37.
102 Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 739, 744 (1967). See also Pullen v. State, 802 So.2d
1113 (2001) (Anders procedure for withdrawal of counsel in criminal proceedings applies
to involuntary civil commitments).
103 Three notable earlier exceptions are Quesnell v. State, 83 Wash.2d 224, 517 P.2d 568
(1974); State ex rel. Hawks v. Lazaro, 157 W.Va. 417, 202 S.E.2d 109 (1974); and State ex
rel. Memmel v. Mundy, 75 Wis.2d 276, 249 N.W.2d 573 (1977). For the most recent impor-
tant case, see K.G.F., 29 P.3d 485, discussed supra text accompanying notes 35-66.
104 For an analysis of the American Bar Association's MODEL RULES as they apply to
this population, see 1 PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW, supra note 2, §§ 2B-10 to 2B-
10.2.
I focus here primarily on involuntary civil commitment hearings, as my experience
suggests that these are the sort of civil mental disability law case most likely to be assigned
in clinical settings. See generally JAMES A. HOLSTEIN, COURT-ORDERED INSANITY: INTER-
PRETIVE PRACTICE AND INVOLUNTARY COMMITMENT (1993); James A. Holstein, Court
Ordered Incompetence: Conversational Organization in Involuntary Commitment Hearings,
35 Soc. PROBLEMS 458, 459 (1988).
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ceeding, 0 5 the courts - with one important exception 10 6 - generally
have failed to recognize the additional "lawyering qualities"'107 re-
quired to represent a person with mental disabilities. 0 8 An examina-
tion of the attorney's duties in such representation, however, reveals
that there are greater obligations here than in other types of litigation
or in other counseling situations. Think about the impact this has in
clinical teaching and practice settings.
First, the attorney's initial interview with a person facing civil
commitment is usually conducted on alien territory, a factor that may
"shape interview content."'1 9 The first principle of interviewing is that
the interview room "should not be threatening, noisy or distract-
ing." 110 When initial interviews are typically held randomly in corners
of crowded wards"' - in a context dramatically unlike that of the
prototypical attorney-client office interview 12 - the interviewee
often may become "suspicious, terrified, puzzled or simply distrustful
of the attorney. 11 3 Also, just as "examiner bias"114 is prevalent in the
doctor-patient interview, it likely pervades this attorney-client rela-
tionship as well.
Second, the attorney's investigation will differ from that of "ordi-
nary cases. 1" 5 The ability to read and understand medical charts"16
105 See, e.g., Miller v. Quatsoe, 332 F. Supp. 1269, 1275 (E.D. Wis. 1971) ("These differ-
ences-the need to investigate an entire life, to devise a plan for a useful future and the
maturity of his client-emphasize lawyering qualities which require time to germinate in
each case rather than those qualities which come reflexively to the experienced attorney.")
(emphasis added).
106 See K.G.F., 29 P.3d 498, discussed supra text accompanying notes 35-66.
107 Id.
108 But see id. at 490-95 (listing duties of counsel in involuntary civil commitment case,
including detailed investigations and comprehensive client interviews). One of the leading
theoretical commentaries states: "Once the adversary nature of the lawyer's role is reestab-
lished in commitment proceedings, his role in operational terms resembles that in ordinary
cases." Note, The Role of Counsel in the Civil Commitment Process: A Theoretical Frame-
work, 84 YALE L.J. 1540, 1562 (1975) (emphasis added). For an excellent review of the
pertinent issues, see Cook, supra note 68.
109 ERVING GOFFMAN, ASYLUMS 13 (1961); Perlin & Sadoff, supra note 25, at 169 (citing
Lockwood, How to Represent a Client Facing Civil Commitment, 26 PRACTICAL LAW. 51,
54 (1980)).
110 ALFRED BENJAMIN, THE HELPING INTERVIEw 3 (1969).
111 See, e.g., ROSEMARY BALSAM & ALAN BALSAM, BECOMING A PSYCHOTHERAPIST: A
CLINICAL PRIMER 28 (1974).
112 See, e.g., Steven G. Fey & Steven Goldberg, Legal Interviewing from a Psychological
Perspective: An Attorney's Handbook, 14 WILLAMETTE L.J. 217, 233-34 (1978)
113 Perlin & Sadoff, supra note 25, at 170. A leading psychotherapy text notes that even
a change in office location "may be particularly upsetting for a borderline psychotic or
psychotic patient." BALSAM & BALSAM, supra note 111, at 30.
114 Le., doctors tend to assign more "favorable" diagnostic labels to wealthier patients.
See, e.g., JAMES PAGE, PSYCHOPATHOLOGY: THE SCIENCE OF UNDERSTANDING DEVIANCE
164 (1971).
115 Perlin & Sadoff, supra note 25, at 170 n.76:
[Vol. 9:683
Sanism in Clinical Teaching
and the ability to communicate with mental disability professionals"17
are essential aspects of the investigation of virtually every case involv-
ing a person who is putatively mentally disabled and facing civil com-
mitment. Also, attorneys will need to employ independent psychiatric
(or other medical disability) experts1 8 in a significant percentage of
such cases.
Third, while attorneys need to develop special skills and sensitivi-
ties in interviewing witnesses in any case, 119 these skills must be more
finely honed and sensitivities heightened in cases involving the inter-
viewing of mental disability professionals and mentally disabled per-
sons with regard to events leading to hospitalization and the fact of
hospitalization itself.120
Fourth, the attorney must be able to assume responsibility for an-
swering "classic social service" 12' questions regarding the range of al-
ternatives to inpatient hospitalization of the client - questions that
likely will play a significant factor in the court's disposition of the case:
What halfway houses, community mental health centers, or patient-
run alternatives are available? What economic benefits and entitle-
ments might the patient receive outside the hospital? Is the alterna-
tive program one likely to survive economically in the coming
budget cuts? Is the program one specifically suited for persons with
The lawyer must be highly aware of "hidden agenda" issues. Such hidden agendas -
always a possibility in any case - may be more subtle and nefarious in commitment
cases. Is the commitment hearing a cover for a divorce matter or a child custody
dispute? Is the case simply a "back door" way of dealing with an adolescent with a
drug problem or of attempting to avert a marriage unwanted by other family mem-
bers? A lawyer's "lawyering" instincts must be at their highest level to ferret out
such issues within issues.
See generally Michael L. Perlin, Representing Individuals in the Commitment and Guardi-
anship Process, in 1 LEGAL RIGHTS OF MENTALLY DISABLED PERSONS 497, 514-15 (Paul
Friedman ed., 1979).
116 See Practice Manual: Preparation and Trial of a Civil Commitment Case, 5 MENT.
Dis. L. REP. 281, 285-87 (1981) (Preparation); See generally Guidelines, supra note 57, at
476 (Guideline E6):
Effective legal representation of a respondent requires that the respondent's attor-
ney have free and immediate access to all pertinent documents, including, but not
limited to, the commitment petition, the detention order, the police report, other
documents used to initiate commitment proceedings, the screening report, the pre-
hearing examination reports, and the medical records of the respondent. Because
hearings in civil commitment cases occur much sooner than hearings in most civil
cases, discovery should be expedited and not be impeded by restrictive procedures
and time limits that generally apply in civil proceedings.
117 See generally ANDREW WATSON, PSYCHIATRY FOR LAWYERS (2d ed. 1976).
118 Such an expert will probably be "the single most valuable person to testify on behalf
of a client in a contested commitment hearing." Preparation, supra note 116, at 289.
119 See, e.g., GARY BELLOW & BEATRICE MOULTON, THE LAWYERING PROCESS 32-157
(1981).
120 See, e.g., WATSON, supra note 117, at 16-27.




Counsel also must explore all likely outcomes of the commitment
hearing123 and advise the client of all possible dispositions.1 24 Because
of the more open-ended dispositional phase of the commitment pro-
cess, the range of outcomes here is often significantly greater than in
"ordinary cases."
Fifth, because the prosecution of a civil commitment case often
involves multiple parties - hospital staff, the community authority, a
patient's family 125 - an attorney often must conduct simultaneous
multiple negotiation with parties and nonparties,'2 6 who often "have
radically differing views as to [an individual case's] appropriate dispo-
sition.' 27 Although "the likelihood of success at this stage is demon-
strably greater than at any other,' ' 28 the demands made on the
attorney to develop appropriate negotiation skills 129 are commensu-
rately greater.
Sixth, the attorney's lawyering skills at the commitment hearing
must be heightened for at least three overlapping reasons. Because so
many of the procedural issues raised by commitment have so rarely
been litigated, each contested hearing becomes, to some extent, a
"case offirst impression,"130 and a court's procedural decision there-
122 Id. Of course, if the patient can "surviv[e] safely in freedom," O'Connor v. Donald-
son, 422 U.S. 563, 575 (1975), without any alternative treatment, "it is not the lawyer's role
to attempt to impose such treatment over his client's objection." Perlin & Sadoff, supra
note 25, at 170 (emphasis in original).
123 See, e.g., Perlin & Sadoff, supra note 25, at 170-71 (attorney's role in discussing op-
tion of voluntary commitment is analogized to criminal defense counsel's exploration of
guilty plea option, see, e.g., McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 768-71 (1970)).
124 For example, a client may not meet threshold income or residency eligibility require-
ments for a specific outpatient placement.
125 See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-261 (1997). Compare Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312
(1993) (Kentucky statute granting relatives party status at involuntary civil commitment
hearings is not unconstitutional).
126 To some extent, the commitment process here approximates Prof. Chayes' model of
public law litigation. See, e.g., Abraham Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Liti-
gation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1976).
127 Perlin & Sadoff, supra note 25, at 171.
128 Preparation, supra note 116, at 288. For a statistical confirmation, see Y. Kumasaka
& J. Stokes, Involuntary Hospitalization: Opinions and Attitudes of Psychiatrists and Law-
yers, 13 COMPREHEN. PSYCHIATRY 201 (1972) (over 40% so released); Perlin, supra note
115, at 510; Michael L. Perlin, Mental Patient Advocacy by a Patient Advocate, 54 PSYCHI-
ATRIC Q. 169, 171 (1982) (over six-year period, almost 29% of all patients represented
released to community following entry of advocacy agency as counsel, but prior to formal
hearing).
129 See generally ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES (2d ed. 1991).
130 See, e.g., In re Watson, 91 Cal. App.3d 455, 154 Cal. Rptr. 151 (1979) (challenging
exclusion of patient from commitment hearing); In re James, 67 Ill. App.3d 49, 384 N.E.2d
573 (1978) (same); Hashimi v. Kalil, 388 Mass. 607, 446 N.E.2d 1387 (1983) (enforcing
statutory time limits for filing petition). See generally 1 PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW,
supra note 2, chapter 2C (discussing other procedural litigation in involuntary civil commit-
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fore will have far greater "ripple effects" than in more coherently de-
veloped areas of the law.131 Because of the nature of the proceeding,
attorney-client disputes over such issues as whether a certain witness
should be called to the stand or whether the patient should testify132
will likely be heightened, again requiring more sophisticated counsel-
ing skills on the attorney's part. 133 Finally, because the court will often
be poorly informed as to both substantive and procedural commit-
ment law, 134 the attorney will need to educate the court as to the law's
nuances.
135
Seventh, because case dispositions do not fit into a "discrete para-
digm, ' 136 "there is a far greater burden on the attorney to seek dispo-
sitional alternatives than in an ordinary case."' 137 A vivid example is
that of New Jersey's first "discharged pending placement" (DPP)
cases, in which counsel had to assume a heightened role. 138
Eighth, the attorney should be available for representation at pe-
riodic review hearings and appeals. Counsel also should be available
ment cases).
131 For a general discussion of this issue in a public interest law context, see MICHAEL
MELTSNER & PHILIP SCHRAG, PUBLIC INTEREST ADVOCACY: MATERIALS FOR CLINICAL
LEGAL EDUCATION (1974).
132 See, e.g., Tyars v. Finner, 518 F. Supp. 502 (C.D. Cal. 1981), rev'd, 709 F.2d 1274 (9th
Cir. 1983); Cramer v. Tyars, 23 Cal. 3d 131, 588 P.2d 793, 151 Cal. Rptr. 653 (1979); State v.
Mathews, 46 Or. App. 757, 613 P.2d 88 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1040 (1981).
133 See, e.g., BINDER & PRICE, supra note 33, at 192-210.
134 In a North Carolina study, fewer than 20% of judges approved of an adversarial
model for commitment hearings, see Hiday, supra note 26, at 1037.
135 Cf., e.g., ROBERT L. SADOFF, FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY: A PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR
LAWYERS AND PSYCHIATRISTS 35, 47-48 (1985).
136 See Perlin & Sadoff, supra note 25, at 166-67.
137 Id. at 172 (citing, in part, NICHOLAS KITrRIE, THE RIGHT TO BE DIFFERENT: DEVI-
ANCE AND ENFORCED THERAPY (1973) (footnotes omitted)):
While a court-appointed probation officer in the criminal process is specifically
charged with finding and monitoring alternatives to incarceration, such officials are
rarely present in the commitment process. The impact of "transitional service" social
staff at hospitals on structuring such alternatives has been little studied but the find-
ings of such a study would probably show little impact on the day-to-day functioning
of the commitment process. Individual courts may consider the full range of social,
educational, and religious agencies and may find an acceptable alternative to the
commitment process. Such possibilities place a burden on the attorney to search out
and study such possible placements for his client, while at the same time avoiding the
excesses of what Kittrie has termed "The Therapeutic State."
138 See Matter of S.L., 94 N.J. 128, 462 A.2d 1252 (1983). See also 1 PERLIN, MENTAL
DISABILITY LAW, supra note 2, § 2C-6.3 (discussing DPP status and the successor "condi-
tions extended placing placement" (CEPP) status in general), and Michael L. Perlin, Dis-
charged Pending Placement": The Due Process Rights of the Institutionalized Mentally
Handicapped With "Nowhere To Go," in 5 DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHIATRY, Lesson 21 (1985),
reprinted in 4 THE SCHIZOPHRENIAS 210 (Frank Flach ed., 1988) (discussing DPP status);
In re Commitment of B.L., 346 N.J. Super. 285, 787 A.2d 928 (App. Div. 2002) (discussing
CEPP status).
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to provide legal services in such "collateral" matters 139 as the patient's
right to treatment, right to refuse treatment, and protection of civil
rights while institutionalized. 140
F. Counsel's Role14 1
Counsel's role also must be considered through a series of other
filters: the reality that legal rights are not implicitly self-executing; the
myth that adequate counsel is regularly available to all individuals
with mental disabilities; the need for counsel to serve an educative
function for the court; the impact of counsel on the vindication of col-
lateral legal rights; and the significance of counsel in the confrontation
of other related moral, social and political issues that flow from the
trial process when individuals with mental disabilities are at risk.
1. Rights Are Not Self-executing
Legal rights are not necessarily self-executing. 142 A court's decla-
ration of a right "to" a service or a right to be free "from" an intrusion
does not in se provide that service or guarantee such freedom from
intrusion. A right is only a paper declaration without an accompany-
ing remedy. 143 Without counsel to guarantee enforcement, the rights
"victories" that have been won in test case and law reform litigation in
this area are unlikely to have any real impact on persons with mental
disabilities. 44
139 An early and helpful analysis is suggested in Robert J. Golten, Role of Defense
Counsel in the Criminal Commitment Process, 10 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 385, 408-09 (1972).
For other considerations, see James Cohen, The Attorney-Client Privilege, Ethical Rules,
and the Criminal Defendant, 52 U. MIAMI L. REV. 529 (1998); Slobogin & Mashburn, supra
note 68.
140 On the interplay of the adjudication of treatment rights and the commitment hear-
ing, see In re D.J.M., 158 N.J. Super. 497, 386 A.2d 870 (App. Div. 1978), discussed in 1
PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW supra note 2, § 2C-8.1, at 507-08.
141 This section is generally adapted from Perlin, supra note 30.
142 Bruce Winick, Restructuring Competency to Stand Trial, 32 UCLA L. REV. 921, 941
(1985). See also Grant Morris & J. Reid Meloy, Out of Mind? Out of Sight: The Uncivil
Commitment of Permanently Incompetent Criminal Defendants, 27 U.C. DAvIs L. REV. 1, 8
(1993).
143 See generally Donald Zeigler, Rights Require Remedies: A New Approach to the En-
forcement of Rights in the Federal Courts, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 665 (1987) (Zeigler, New Ap-
proach). See also Donald Zeigler, Rights, Rights of Action, and Remedies: An Integrated
Approach, 76 WASH. L. REV. 67 (2001). According to Professor Zeigler:
[A] right without a remedy is not a legal right; it is merely a hope or a wish. ...
Unless a duty can be enforced, it is not really a duty; it is only a voluntary obligation
that a person can fulfill or not at his whim. ...
... Rights promote well-being in the broadest sense. They secure the dignity and
the integrity of human beings.... Rights give people control over their lives and are
essential to self-respect.
Zeigler, New Approach, supra, at 678-79 (footnotes omitted).
144 Three examples should suffice. In 1972, the Supreme Court decided in Jackson v.
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2. The Myth of Adequate Counsel
The development of organized and regularized counsel programs
has given rise to the supposition that such counsel is regularly availa-
ble to persons with mental disabilities in individual matters involving
their commitment to, retention in and release from psychiatric hospi-
Indiana that it violates due process to commit an individual awaiting criminal trial for more
than the "reasonable period of time" needed to determine "whether there is a substantial
chance of his attaining the capacity to stand trial in the foreseeable future." 406 U.S. 715,
733 (1972). Yet, thirteen years later, Professor Bruce Winick reported that, in almost half
of the states, Jackson had yet to be implemented, and the pre-Jackson problem of overlong
commitments "still persist[ed]." Winick, supra note 142, at 940; see also RONALD ROESCH
& STEPHEN GOLDING, COMPETENCY TO STAND TRIAL 121-26 (1980); Barbara Weiner,
Mental Disability and the Criminal Law, in SAMUEL J. BRAKEL ET AL, THE MENTALLY
DISABLED AND THE LAW 693, 704 (3d ed. 1985). A decade after Winick published his arti-
cle, Morris and Meloy reported that Jackson remains "ignored [and] circumvented." Mor-
ris & Meloy, supra note 142, at 8.
In another setting, even though the District of Columbia Code permits patients seek
either periodic review of their commitment or an independent psychiatric evaluation, evi-
dence developed in an important case has revealed that, in twenty-two years following the
enactment of the relevant provision, not a single patient exercised the rights to this statu-
tory review. Streicher v. Prescott, 663 F. Supp. 335, 343 (D. D.C. 1987). See generally
Michael L. Perlin, Morality and Pretextuality, Psychiatry and Law: Of "Ordinary Common
Sense," Heuristic Reasoning, and Cognitive Dissonance, 19 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY
& L. 131,133 (1991). See also David Wexler, The Waivability of Recommitment Hearings,
20 ARIZ. L. REV. 175, 176-78 (1978) (discussing problems inherent in patient-initiated re-
view mechanisms).
Similarly, hard-fought institutional reform "victories" in cases declaring broad rights
to treatment had little "real world" impact because there were no lawyers available to
ensure that the decisions would be properly implemented. For discussion of the implemen-
tation of the broad staffing orders in the landmark right to treatment case of Wyatt v.
Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala.), 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972), affd sub nom.
Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974), see WYATr V. STICKNEY: RETROSPECT
ANT PROSPECT (L.R. Jones & R. Parlour, eds., 1981); Joseph O'Reilly & Bruce Sales, Set-
ting Physical Standards for Mental Hospitals: To Whom Should the Courts Listen?, 8 INT'L
J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 301 (1986); Joseph O'Reilly & Bruce Sales, Privacy for the Institution-
alized Mentally Ill Are Court-Ordered Standards Effective?, 11 LAW & HUMAN. BEHAV. 41
(1987). See generally 2 PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW, supra note 2, Chapter 3A. The
litigation in Wyatt finally concluded less than three years ago. See Wyatt v. Sawyer, 105 F.
Supp. 2d 1234 (M.D. Ala. 2000).
There are many other equivalent examples involving potential collateral actions. Al-
though several cases have recognized patients' right to vote, see, e.g., Doe v. Rowe, 156 F.
Supp. 2d 35, 21 NDLR P 155 (D. Me. 2001); Boyd v. Board of Registrars of Voters of
Belchertown, 368 Mass. 631, 334 N.E.2d 629 (1975); Carroll v. Cobb, 139 N.J. Super. 439,
354 A.2d 355 (App. Div. 1976), this right becomes an empty shell if, for instance, there is
no staff worker available to drive the patient to a poll; counsel could insure vindication of
this right by filing a supplemental action to order the hospital to provide such transporta-
tion, compare Reiser v. Prunty, 224 Mont. 1, 727 P.2d 538, 547 (1986) (hospital and psychi-
atrist had no responsibility to protect constitutional right to vote of patient detained under
emergency detention statute). Similarly, a court order mandating the constitutional right to
visitation, see, e.g., Schmidt v. Schubert, 422 F. Supp. 57, 58 (E.D. Wis. 1976), becomes
meaningless if a hospital announces that it cannot provide adequate staff to implement
such visitation rights; again, counsel would be needed to insure an enforceable remedy.
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tals. 145 But, this appearance of general availability is largely illu-
sory. 46 Moreover, such representation is rarely available in a systemic
way in law reform or test cases and is rarely provided in any systemic
way in cases that involve counseling or negotiating short of actual
litigation. 47
Empirical surveys consistently show that quality of counsel is the
single most important factor in the disposition of cases in involuntary
civil commitment systems and in the trial of mentally disabled crimi-
nal defendants. It is only when counsel is provided in an organized,
specialized and regularized way that there is more than a random
chance of lasting, systemic change. Yet, few states appear willing to
provide such counsel in such a manner.
A contrast between the development of case law in Virginia and
Minnesota is especially instructive. Notwithstanding the fact that Vir-
ginia's population is approximately 15% greater than Minnesota's,' 48
Virginia had only two published litigated civil cases on questions of
mental hospitalization during the decade from 1976 to 1986, while
Minnesota had at least 101 such cases in the same period.149 Signifi-
145 See, e.g., Alan Stone, The Myth of Advocacy, 30 Hosp. & COMMUN. PSYCHIATRY
819, 821-22 (1979) (charging that a "one-sided advocacy system" exists in which patients
are regularly represented by zealous and conscientious lawyers); see also, e.g., French v.
Blackburn, 428 F. Supp. 1351, 1357 (M.D.N.C. 1977), affd, 443 U.S. 901 (1979) (rejecting
plaintiff's assumption that lawyer in involuntary civil commitment case will not act in cli-
ent's best interest).
146 See M.C. Olley & James Ogloff, Patients' Rights Advocacy: Implications for Program
Design and Implementation, 22 J. MENT. HEALTH ADMIN, 368, 369 (1995). See generally
K.G.F., 29 P.3d 485.
147 See, e.g., Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, (1990) (counsel is not required in hear-
ing to determine whether prisoner has right to refuse involuntary administration of psycho-
tropic medication); Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 500 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring)
(counsel is not required in hearing to determine whether prison inmate should be trans-
ferred to state psychiatric hospital);
Statistics compiled by the National Institute of Mental Health regarding the provision
of counsel by P&A systems to institutionalized individuals suggest that class-action type
cases were instituted in fewer than half of all jurisdictions in fiscal year 1989. FY 1989
Report on Activities Under PL 99-319, the Protection and Advocacy for Mentally Ill Individ-
uals Act 61, Table 9 (1990).
On the variance in representation in right to refuse treatment cases, see Perlin &
Dorfman, supra note 14.
148 As of April 1, 2000, Virginia's population was 7,078,515, while Minnesota's was
4,919,479.
149 Ingo Keilitz et al., A Study of the Emergency Mental Health Services and Involuntary
Civil Commitment Practices in Virginia 47 (1989). While Minnesota court rules command
patients' counsel to "advocate vigorously" on behalf of their clients, see MINN. R. COMMIT-
MENT, Rule 4.01 (1997), there is no comparable provision in Virginia law, cf VA. STAT.
§ 19.2-169.5 (2002) (role of counsel in raising insanity in criminal proceedings).
Compare K.G.F., 29 P.3d at 498-500 (constitutionally mandating adherence to Com-
mitment Guidelines E5, E 2 and F5 (see Guidelines, supra note 57), on client interviews,
the attorney's advocacy function, and the attorney's role in the courtroom).
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cantly, Minnesota has a tradition of providing vigorous counsel to per-
sons with mental disabilities, 150 while Virginia does not. 151
3. Counsel's Educative Function
The presence of structured counsel - of lawyers supported by
mental health professionals - also serves an important internal edu-
cative function by making it more likely that all participants in the
mental disability trial process, including judges, are sensitized to the
social, cultural and political issues involved in representation of such a
marginalized class.152 The disappointing results reported nearly 25
years ago by Dr. Norman Poythress - that merely training lawyers
about psychiatric techniques and psychological nomenclature made
little difference in ultimate case outcome 153 - reveal that education
about the law and the clinical details of mental illness are not enough.
Counsel must be attitudinally and ethically 154 educated if they are to
provide truly adequate representation.
4. Implementation of Collateral Rights
If counsel is not adequate, it is unlikely that attorneys will vigor-
150 Under MINN. R. COMMITMENT, Comment to Rule 4.07 (1997):
A. All proceedings under the [Act] are adversarial. Minimum adversary representa-
tion ordinarily includes, but is not limited to:
1. being familiar with statute and case law and court rules which govern commit-
ment proceedings; and
2. interviewing respondent no later than 24 hours after confinement .. .; and
3. reviewing respondent's medical records ... early enough to insure sufficient
time to investigate and secure additional medical evaluations, and/or prepare
for the hearings; and
4. contacting or interviewing all persons whose testimony might tend to support
respondent's position and subpoenaing witnesses if necessary; and
5. investigating alternatives less restrictive than those sought in the petition; and
6. attempting to interview prior to the hearing any persons who might testify for
the petitioner at the hearing; and
7. informing respondent of the latter's rights, including the right to appeal.
B. [This rule] is intended to insure that once appointed, the same lawyer will con-
tinue to represent respondent
151 See Keilitz et al., supra note 149, at 39-45, and especially at 42 ("Given the absence
of a district attorney representing the Commonwealth, or an attorney representing the
petitioner, commitment proceedings are at best, quasi-adversarial").
152 See generally Perlin & Sadoff, supra note 25, at 168-73.
153 Poythress concluded that the "trained" lawyers' behavior in court was not materially
different from that of "untrained" lawyers because the former group's attitudes toward
their clients had not changed. Mere knowledge of cross-examination methods, he noted,
"did not deter them from taking [the] more traditional, passive, paternal stance towards
the proposed patients." Poythress, supra note 28, at 15. As one trainee noted: "I really
enjoyed your workshop, and I've been reading over your materials and its [sic] all very
interesting, but this is the real world, and we've got to do something with these people.
They're sick." Id.
154 See DAVID WEXLER, MENTAL HEALTH LAW 111 n.55 (1981).
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ously seek to execute and implement other collateral rights. In Ake v.
Oklahoma, for instance, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that a criminal
defendant who makes a threshold ex parte showing that his or her
sanity at the time of the offense is likely to be a "significant factor" at
trial is constitutionally entitled to state funded psychiatric assis-
tance. 155 But because Ake generally has been read narrowly and with
little creativity, 156 the rationale of Justice Marshall's opinion - that
psychiatrists will assist lay jurors "to make a sensible and educated
determination" about the defendant's medical condition at the time of
the offense 157- has rarely been fulfilled. If litigants with mental disa-
bilities were afforded more adequate counsel, Ake probably would
have been implemented in a manner that was truer to the spirit of the
Supreme Court's decision. 158
5. Other Moral, Social and Political Issues
Adequate counsel also is needed to deal with other collateral
moral, social and political issues that, to an important degree, affect
legal and public decision-making in this area.159 These include issues
such as the "dilemma of the moral clinician," 160 the impact of pretex-
tuality on the mental disability trial process, 161 the degree to which
155 470 U.S. 68, 74 (1985).
156 See generally 3 PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW, supra note 2, § 10-4.3, at 431-39
(2d ed. 2000), and cases cited in id. at nn.635-80.
157 Ake, 470 U.S. at 80.
158 See, e.g., In re Brown, 1986 WL 13385 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 26,1986), (child custody);
Interest of Goodwin, 366 N.W.2d 809, 814-15 (N.D. 1985) (civil commitment case); Matter
of Sanders, 108 N.M. 434, 773 P.2d 1241, 1246 (Ct. App. 1989) (treatment guardianship
revocation). Goodwin is considered in Interest of R.M., 555 N.W.2d 798 (N.D. 1996).
For early consideration of the implementation of Ake in general, see Pamela Casey &
Ingo Keilitz, An Evaluation of Mental Health Expert Assistance Provided to Indigent Crimi-
nal Defendants: Organization, Administration, and Fiscal Management, 34 N.Y.L. SCH. L.
REV. 19 (1989). On the related ethical implications of Ake, see Paul Appelbaum, In the
Wake of Ake: The Ethics of Expert Testimony in an Advocate's World, 15 BULL. AM.
ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 15 (1987); Stephen Rachlin, From Impartial Expert to Adversary
in the Wake of Ake, 16 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 25 (1985). For a more recent
inquiry, see Amber McGraw, Life But Not Liberty? An Assessment of Noncapital Indigent
Defendants' Rights to Expert Assistance under the Ake v. Oklahoma Doctrine, 79 WASH. U.
L.Q. 951 (2001).
159 See, e.g., Perlin, OCS, supra note 14; Michael L. Perlin, Power Imbalances in Thera-
peutic and Forensic Relationships, 9 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 111 (1991).
160 See, e.g., Perlin, supra note 144, at 135-36 (considering evidence suggesting that, in
response to legislative actions tightening involuntary civil commitment criteria, some fo-
rensic mental health professionals responded that such mandates could be ignored if they
conflicted with the witnesses' "moral judgment").
161 Id. at 133-35 (referring to the dramatic tension between those subject matter areas in
which courts accept dishonesty and those in which they appear to erect insurmountable
barriers to guard against what is perceived as malingering, feigning or other misuse of the
legal system). See generally PERLIN, HIDDEN PREJUDICE, supra note 2, at 59-75; Michael L.
Perlin, "There's No Success Like Failure/And Failure's No Success at All": Exposing the
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"ordinary common sense" drives decision-making by judges and ju-
rors in such cases,162 and the pervasiveness of heuristic biases in such
decision-making. 163 If these issues are not confronted by counsel, it is
likely that the pervasive cognitive and behavioral biases infecting deci-
sion-making in this area will continue to go unnoticed and
unabated. 164
It is apparent, therefore, that the role of counsel in the represen-
tation of persons with mental disabilities is multi-textured and contin-
ually evolving. Systemic decision-makers need to acknowledge the
complexity of this role, the historic shortcomings of sporadic counsel
serving the population in question, and possible remedies for the long-
standing systematic problems. Yet, scant attention has been paid -
by judges, 165 by scholars,166 and practicing lawyers 167 - to the ques-
tions that I have posed here. This is a topic that appears - inexplica-
bly - "off the table" for purposes of legal discourse. This contrasts
- sharply and sadly - with the legal academy's interest in parallel
issues that affect women, people of color, and other minorities. 168 In
the following section, I explore some of the possible explanations for
this "disconnect."
Pretextuality of Kansas v. Hendricks, 92 Nw. U. L. REV. 1247 (1998).
162 See, e.g., Perlin, OCS, supra note 14, at 22-39. This concept is examined in detail in
Richard Sherwin, Dialects and Dominance: A Study of Rhetorical Fields in Confessions, 136
U. PA. L. REV. 729 (1988). I have returned to this topic recently in a criminal law context in
Perlin, Neonaticide, supra note 14.
163 Perlin, OCS, supra note 14, at 12-22 (referring to simplifying cognitive devices that
frequently lead to distorted and systematically erroneous decisions due to ignoring or mis-
use of rationally useful information). See generally Michael Saks & Robert Kidd, Human
Information Processing and Adjudication: Trial by Heuristics, 15 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 123
(1980-81).
164 The "therapeutic jurisprudence" scholarship should lead participants in the system to
critically weigh the therapeutic (or anti-therapeutic) effects of the mental disability system.
See THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 34; Mary Berkheiser, Frasier Meets CLEA:
Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Law School Clinics, 5 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL'Y & L. 1147
(1999); Gould & Perlin, supra note 7. See infra text accompanying notes 195-200. Ade-
quate counsel is needed to insure consideration of the therapeutic potential inherent in
mental disability litigation. See, e.g., John Ensminger & Thomas Liguori, The Therapeutic
Significance of the Civil Commitment Hearing: An Unexplored Potential, 6 J. PSYCHIATRY
& L. 5 (1978), reprinted in THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 34, at 245.
165 But see K.G.F., 29 P.3d 485.
166 But see Cook, supra note 68; Slobogin & Mashburn, supra note 68.
167 But see, e.g., Deborah A. Dorfman, Effectively Implementing Title I of the Americans
with Disabilities Act for Mentally Disabled Persons: A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Analysis,
8 J.L. & HEALTH 105 (1993-94); Deborah A. Dorfman, Through a Therapeutic Jurispru-
dence Filter: Fear and Pretextuality in Mental Disability Law, 10 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTs.
805 (1993).
168 See, e.g., sources cited supra note 1. And this, of course, is not to suggest that this
interest is somehow inappropriate or unwarranted. My concern here is the starkly-con-
trasted lack of interest in the issues that I am discussing in this article.
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III. SANISM AND THE CLINICAL SETrING
Given this depressing background, sanism in the clinical class-
room must be considered from two different perspectives: the clinical
teacher's and the clinic student's. There is no database of empirical
evidence on which to draw; I am basing this section largely on my
varied personal, experiences. As a practitioner, I supervised clinical
students for ten years in placements in the New Jersey Department of
the Public Advocate (mostly in the Division of Mental Health Advo-
cacy, which I directed from 1974-82).169 As a professor, I was the di-
rector of New York Law School's Federal Litigation Clinic from 1984-
90; the bulk of the clinic's caseload involved representation of men-
tally and physically disabled persons in SSI and SSDI cases.170 Since
1992, I have taught a course, Mental Disability Litigation Seminar and
Workshop, in which students are placed in mental disability law set-
tings (mostly, but not exclusively, with offices of the N.Y. Mental Hy-
giene Legal Services). 171
Much of what follows is admittedly impressionistic. I cannot, and
do not, offer it as a valid or reliable behavioral study. 172 But I am
writing it nonetheless so as to share with the reader the conclusions I
have reached after having worked in this area of the law for nearly 30
years.
169 The students came from a variety of law schools, local and national, public and pri-
vate, "top ten" and otherwise.
170 See, e.g., Tirado v. Bowen, 842 F.2d 595 (2d Cir. 1988); Mejia v. Bowen, 1988 WL
125678 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 10, 1988); Tirado v. Bowen, 1987 WL 12377 (S.D.N.Y. July 2, 1987);
Cabrera v. Heckler, 1986 WL 9228 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 11, 1986); Barrino v. Bowen, 1986 WL
6482 (S.D.N.Y. June 4, 1986); Hill v. Sullivan, 125 F.R.D. 86 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 12, 1989);
Baran v. Bowen, 710 F. Supp. 53 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); Tirado v. Bowen, 705 F. Supp. 179
(S.D.N.Y. 1989); Alvarez v. Bowen, 704 F. Supp. 49 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); Correa v. Bowen, 682
F. Supp. 755 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). The clinic also filed amicus briefs on behalf of coalitions of
persons with mental disabilities in at least three United States Supreme Court cases: Colo-
rado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986); U.S. Dept. of Treasury, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco
and Firearms v. Galioto, 477 U.S. 556 (1986), and Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985).
To the best of my knowledge, surprisingly few clinical programs have ever provided
legal representation to "psychiatric survivor groups." Touro Law School's Mental Disabil-
ity Law Clinic - directed by William Brooks - is an important exception. I was especially
heartened to learn that the Parkdale Community Legal Services Clinic at Osgoode Hall
Law School provides assistance to a psychiatric survivor group. See Imai, supra note 88, at
199.
A recent survey (supplemented by personal knowledge) reveals that approximately
ten American law schools - Chicago, Lewis & Clark, New England, New York Law School,
Richmond, Texas, Touro, Virginia, William Mitchell, and Yale - offer courses that, broadly,
could be called "mental disability law clinics." See Jean H. Bliss, Mental Disability Law
Class Survey (Jan. 2002) (unpublished; on file with author).
171 See Gould & Perlin, supra note 7, at 342 (discussing this course), and id. at 365-
71(discussing placements).
172 1 acknowledge that my reliance on anecdotal impressions may have inadvertently led
me to omit other and different experiences.
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A. Sanism and Clinical Teaching
Several years ago, I gave the keynote presentation at a Society of
American Law Teachers (SALT) conference, and presented a paper
titled, "Mental Disability, Sanism, Pretextuality, Therapeutic Jurispru-
dence, and Teaching Law. ' 173 SALT regularly provides speaking fo-
rums for professors whose primary scholarly (and often personal)
interests are the rights of the "discrete and insular minorities" de-
scribed in footnote 4 of the Carolene Products case.174 SALT draws
from the ranks of politically progressive law professors, including
many who articulate a commitment to social justice as one of the rea-
sons they joined the academy. The organization has been a consistent
voice in the fight to insure diversity in the classroom and the curricu-
lum. 175 Each year, at the Association of American Law Professors'
annual conference, there is a SALT meeting, and often (if not always),
some political activity "in the streets. '176 Yet, the response to my talk
was strikingly at odds with this commitment to diversity and social
justice. In an article subsequently published in the SALT Equalizer,
Professor Rogelio Lasso wrote that he found it particularly disturbing
that "Sanism" merited a plenary presentation but that the "disgraceful
lack of racial diversity of law school faculties" did not.177
While I recognize that this reaction may be idiosyncratic, I do not
think that this is the case. One of my major scholarly interests is the
rights of persons institutionalized because of mental illness to engage
in voluntary sexual interaction. 178 In my first paper on this topic, par-
173 See Marjorie Silver, Love, Hate, and Other Emotional Interference in the Lawyer!
client Relationship, 6 CLIN. L. REV. 259, 288 n.151 (1999) (discussing SALT presentation).
174 See Perlin, Misdemeanor Outlaw, supra note 14, at 219, discussing the "heralded
'footnote 4' of the United States v. Carolene Products [304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938)] case,
which has served as the springboard for nearly a half century of challenges to state and
municipal laws that have operated in discriminatory ways against other minorities." See
supra note 18.
175 9:00 A.M. Opening Plenary, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 1586, 1653 (1997) ("The Society of
American Law Teachers, for example, is an organization of progressive law professors who
have annual or sometimes twice annual teaching conferences, many of which are directed
at how our teaching can reflect our social values and how we can effectively raise these
issues in the classroom").
176 See, e.g., Francisco Valdes, Solomon's Shames: Law as Might and Inequality, 23
THURGOOD MARSHALL L. REV. 351, 438 n.70 (1998) ("The SALT multiyear Action Cam-
paign was kickedoff with the march held in San Francisco during the 1998 AALS Annual
Meeting").
177 Gould & Perlin, supra note 7, at 354 n.93 (quoting Rogelio Lasso, Diversity Is As
Diversity Does, SALT EQUALIZER, Dec. 1994, at 18-19).
178 See, e.g., PERLIN, HIDDEN PREJUDICE, supra note 2, at 157-74; 2 PERLIN, MENTAL
DISABILITY LAW, supra note 2, § 3C-5.1, at 416-21; Douglas Mossman, Michael Perlin &
Deborah Dorfman, Sex on the Wards: Conundra for Clinicians, 25 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIA-
TRY & L. 441 (1997); Andrew Payne & Michael L. Perlin, Sexual Activity Among Psychiat-
ric Inpatients: International Perspectives, 4 J. FORENS. PSYCHIATRY 109 (1993); Perlin,
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tially titled, Beyond the Last Frontier?, I explained that portion of the
title in this manner:
I have borrowed this phrase from [former] New York Law
School Professor Keri Gould's response to my incredulity when I
told her of the hostile and astonished responses I received from sev-
eral other law professors upon telling them that I was researching
this topic. Professor Gould (who, like me, represented institutional-
ized persons with mental disabilities in her prior career) responded,
"Michael, why are you surprised? For almost everyone, this really is
beyond the last frontier!" 179
But when I present this topic to a live audience, I elaborate in this
manner:
Last year, I was sitting at my faculty lunch table, and conversa-
tion turned to upcoming presentations that we would soon be doing.
My colleagues mostly take left-liberal positions on a wide variety of
issues, and are generically the exact mix of retro '60s generationists
and early baby boomers that you'd expect. They (appropriately)
are quick to criticize any behavior that is racist, sexist, ethnically
bigoted or homophobic. Rush Limbaugh would probably view them
as one of his worst "politically correct" horror fantasies. As you
might expect, I'm not terribly out of place in this group ....
Anyway, when it got to be my turn, I said that I was going to be
speaking about the right of institutionalized mentally disabled per-
sons to sexual interaction. All conversation came to a screeching
halt.
"Michael, are you serious?" "Are you crazy (sic)?" "Michael,
even for you, you've gone too far!" "What are you going to say
next: that they can get married?!?" Et cetera.
At this stage of my life and career, few things surprise me. Yet,
I must admit that I was stunned - not by the response (I spend lots
of time in places where few people agree with me about anything
[my local bait and tackle shop, for instance], so I don't expect (or
want) agreement with whatever it is I'm talking about), but by the
identity and background of the people who were uttering these sen-
timents. As I've said, these were classic New York liberals many of
whom had spent much of their distinguished professional, academic
and personal lives rooting out and exposing prejudiced and stere-
otypical behavior toward virtually every minority group one could
imagine. The buck, though, stopped there.
To the general public - and when we talk about the idea of mental
patients having sex, a roomful of left-leaning law professors is the
general public (in the same way that I suspect a roomful of left-
Sexual Interaction; supra note 14; Perlin, Promises, supra note 14.
179 Perlin, supra note 14, at 520 n.10.
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leaning psychologists, psychiatrists or social workers would be) -
this idea is far beyond the last frontier. And that insight (probably
not a terribly original one on my part) really is the heart of the
meta-thesis of my talk today.' 80
For years, I regularly and religiously attended the full-day
Clinical Section program at the AALS January conference. I never
miss an issue of the truly-excelleht Clinical Law Review. My attend-
ance at AALS has gotten spottier over the years, but I generally spend
at least some time at the clinical meetings. I cannot recall the last time,
if ever, that a mental disability law issue was discussed 181 - and let
me be clear, the failure to take mental disability law issues seriously is
an indicator of sanism - nor can I ever recall sanist student attitudes
on the scholarly agenda (although certainly, racist, sexist, and
homophobic attitudes have been discussed frequently). 182
Stigma may be part of the answer. We know that the stigma of
mental illness also affects - and stigmatizes - mental health profes-
sionals 183 and medical students.184 The extent to which it affects law
180 See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin, Hospitalized Psychiatric Patients and Sexual Interactions:
Rights and Responsibilities (keynote presentation, annual conference, National Associa-
tion of Rights, Protection, and Advocacy, Sacramento, CA, October 2000). I must point
out that none of my clinical colleagues participated in this lunchtable discussion.
There was probably only a handful of law professors in the room in Sacramento when
I gave this talk. However, if the opportunity ever arises to speak about this topic to a
mostly-law professor audience, I will definitely repeat the same story.
181 Of course, multiple variables affect the decisions of all scholars as to where to pub-
lish their articles. By way of example, my friend and colleague, the late Stanley Herr,
regularly published articles about mental disability law in a wide range of "traditional" law
reviews (see, e.g., Reforming Disability Nondiscrimination Laws: A Comparative Perspec-
tive, 35 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 305 (Fall 2001/Winter 2002); Special Education Law &
Children with Reading and Other Disabilities, 28 J. L. & EDuc. 337 (1999); Questioning the
Questionnaires: Bar Admissions and Candidates with Disabilities, 42 VILL. L. REV 635
(1997); A Way to Go Home: Supportive Housing and Housing Assistance Preferences for
the Homeless, 23 STETSON L. REV. 345 (1994)), and chose to publish about clinical
pedagogy in this journal (see Ethical Decision-making and Ethics Instruction in Clinical
Law Practice, 3 CLIN. L. REV. 109 (1996)).
182 For a rare law review piece discussing this issue from a personal perspective, see
Naomi Himmelhoch, In the Padded Closet: Thoughts on a Secret Life, 10 HASTINGS
WOMEN'S L.J. 463 (1999). Professor Marjorie Silver also shares with students experiences
as a person with a diagnosed mental disability. Personal conversation, Oct. 19, 2001. But
certainly there is no law review article in the mental disability law literature that parallels,
say, Nancy Polikoff, Am I My Client?: The Role Confusion of a Lawyer Activist, 31 HARV.
C.R. - C.L. L. REV. 443, 443-44 (1996):
I am a lesbian activist. I support and engage in a variety of activities designed to
change the fundamental way in which American society views homosexuality. Some
of this work entails changing the law, especially in the area of gaining respect and
recognition for lesbian and gay families. Other aspects of this work fall outside the
legal system, including organizing and attending demonstrations and conferences,
public speaking, fundraising for groups involved in cultural change and political and
economic empowerment, and writing for non-legal audiences.
183 See Dichter, supra note 20, at 203; Glen Gabbard & Krin Gabbard, Cinematic Stereo-
Spring 20031
CLINICAL LAW REVIEW
teachers who teach mental disability law, law students who study the
subject and practicing psychiatrists and other mental health profes-
sionals who treat persons subject to mental disability law is not
known, but it would be naive to assume that it is not an issue. 185
Because sanism is so often invisible and because it remains politi-
cally acceptable, sins of omission can be perhaps even more troubling
than sins of commission (which can, at least, be addressed frontally).
By way of example, I have been told on many occasions by clinical
colleagues that sanism simply isn't as "important" or as "hurtful" as is
racism or sexism or homophobia. (The use of the descriptor "hurtful"
is especially illuminating because it implicitly suggests that persons
with mental disabilities do not have the same range of feeling that the
rest of us presumably possess.) 18 6 And this attitude also blindly ig-
nores the reality that so much of our bias toward persons with mental
disabilities is race- and class-based. 187 Consider the story with which I
begin my recent book, THE HIDDEN PREJUDICE: MENTAL DISABILITY
ON TRIAL:
Soon after I became Director of New Jersey's Division of Mental
Health Advocacy, I read a story in the New York Times magazine
section that summarized for me many of the frustrations of my job.
The article dealt with an ex-patient, Gerald Kerrigan, who
wandered the streets of the Upper West Side of Manhattan. Kerri-
gan never threatened or harmed anybody, but he was described as
"different," "off," "not right," somehow. It made other residents of
that neighborhood - traditionally home to one of the nation's most
types Contributing to the Stigmatization of Psychiatrists, in STIGMA, supra note 4, at 113.
184 See Dickstein & Hinz, supra note 20, at 153.
185 1 cannot resist sharing this story. In August 2000, 1 went to San Francisco to speak to
the American Psychological Association's annual conference. On the airport shuttle, the
shuttle driver asked, "Is anyone here for a convention?" I said, yes, and the driver asked
me, "Which one?" When I replied, "The American Psychological Association," the woman
sitting next to me on the van moved a few inches in the other direction. I then said, "But
I'm not a psychologist." She moved back. When the driver asked me what I did, I said I
was a law professor. She stayed where she was. But then another passenger in the back of
the van - whom I later learned, coincidentally, was a law student - asked "What do you
teach?" When I responded, "Mental disability law," the woman moved away again. As
Dave Barry would have said, I am not making this up.
186 On the hurtfulness of homophobia, see, e.g., John Russ, Shall We Dance? Gay Equal-
ity and Religious Exemptions at Private California High School Proms, 42 N.Y.L. SCH. L.
REV. 71, 77 n.33 (1998). On the hurtfulness of racism, see, e.g., Richard Delgado & Jean
Stefancic, Hateful Speech, Loving Communities: Why Our Notion of a "Just Balance"
Changes So Slowly, 82 CALIF. L. REV. 851, 860 n.51 (1994). On the hurtfulness of sexism,
see, e.g., Ann Freedman, Feminist Legal Method in Action: Challenging Racism, Sexism,
and Homophobia in Law School, 23 GA. L. REV. 849, 873 (1990).
187 See PERLIN, HIDDEN PREJUDICE, supra note 2, at 84, and id. n.47 (citing studies). On
the way that clinics approach race issues, see, e.g., Michelle Jacobs, People from the Foot-
notes: The Missing Element in Client-Centered Counseling, 27 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV.
345 (1997); Hing, supra note 1.
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liberal voting blocs - nervous to have him in the vicinity, and the
story focused on the response of a community block association to
his presence. The story hinted darkly that the social "experimenta-
tion" of deinstitutionalization was somehow the villain.
Soon after that, I read an excerpt from Elizabeth Ashley's au-
tobiography in New York magazine (a magazine read by many of
those same Upper West Siders). Ashley - a prominent (and not
unimportantly) strikingly attractive actress - told of her institu-
tionalization in one of New York City's most esteemed private psy-
chiatric hospitals and of her subsequent release from that hospital
to live with George Peppard, and to costar with Robert Redford on
Broadway in Barefoot in the Park.
Ashley was praised for her courage. Kerrigan was emblematic
of a major "social problem." Both were persons who had been di-
agnosed with mental illness. Both of their mental illnesses were seri-
ous enough to require hospitalization. Both were subsequently
released. Yet their stories are presented - and read - in entirely
different ways.
Gerald Kerrigan's story reflected the failures of "deinstitution-
alization" and demonstrated why the application of civil libertarian
concepts to the involuntary civil commitment process was a failure.
Elizabeth Ashley's story reflected the fortitude of a talented and
gritty woman who had the courage to "come out" and share her
battle with mental illness. No one discussed Gerald Kerrigan's au-
tonomy values (or the quality of life in the institution from which he
was released). No one (in discussing Ashley's case) characterized
George Peppard's condo as a "deinstitutionalization facility" or la-
beled starring in a Broadway smash as participation in an "aftercare
program."
Ashley was beautiful, talented and wealthy. And thus she was
different. Kerrigan was "different," but in a troubling way. But the
connection between Kerrigan and Ashley was never made.188
Blindness to sanism is epidemic. When I discuss the Americans
with Disabilities Act with friends and with other lawyers - a universe
that presents prototypically, liberal "takes" on a variety of social is-
sues (race discrimination, homophobia, misogyny, etc) - two issues
typically emerge:
First, virtually every person has a horror story about how "unrea-
sonable" ADA demands caused clients to go out of business, pre-
188 PERLIN, HIDDEN PREJUDICE, supra note 2, at x. I also discuss this anecdote, and its
impact on my thinking about sanism, in Michael L. Perlin, "Half-Wracked Prejudice
Leaped Forth ": Sanism, Pretextuality, and Why and How Mental Disability Law Developed
As It Did, 10 J. CONTEMP. LEG. IssuEs 3, 8 (1999), and in Michael L. Perlin, The Deinstitu-
tionalization Myths: Old Wine in New Bottles, in CONFERENCE REPORT: THE SECOND NA-
TIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE LEGAL RIGHTS OF THE MENTALLY DISABLED 20 (Karl
Menninger & Heather Watts eds., 1979).
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vented other clients from opening new offices, and so forth. The ADA
applications in these stories usually concern ramps and other matters
involving physical accessibility. Generally, these stories do not, on the
surface at least, appear to have anything to do with mental disability
law.
Second, not a single person accepts - on any level - my argu-
ments that discrimination against persons based on disability is like
discrimination based on race, religion, or sexual preference. 189 Even
friends who have "outed" themselves by telling of their experiences in
psychiatric hospitals, or who have movingly shared the impact of ma-
jor depression or bipolar illness on their own lives and/or on the lives
of loved ones, refuse to take me seriously when I argue that disability-
based discrimination is as pernicious, harmful and morally corrupt as
other types of discrimination.' 90
Recent years have - happily - seen an outpouring of clinical
scholarship on virtually every aspect of clinical law. 191 Yet, a
WESTLAW search reveals no literature on the question that I have
been addressing here.192 Moreover, there is scant literature on the im-
portance of collaboration between lawyers and mental health profes-
sionals in a clinical setting.1 93
There is a further disconnect in constitutional and statutory
mental disability law that most of us have perhaps missed. There have
189 This is not to say, of course, that they are identical. Consider the differences - and
similarities - between discrimination based on mental illness and that based on mental
retardation. See e.g., Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312 (1993) (statute providing lesser standard
of proof in cases involving persons with mental retardation than in cases involving persons
with mental illness does not violate equal protection); compare id. at 335 (Souter, J., dis-
senting). My point is this: As a society, we trivialize the discriminatory harms done to
persons with mental disabilities when compared with discriminatory harms based on race
or religion or sexual preference.
190 See Perlin, supra note 11, at 249.
191 See, e.g., Clinical Legal Education: An Annotated Bibliography, CLIN. L. REV. (Spe-
cial Issue #1) (2001).
192 A JLR database search of SANISM & "CLINICAL LEGAL EDUCATION"
reveals just a handful of articles that cite to earlier articles that I wrote about sanism, and
only Marjorie Silver's actually discusses the impact of sanism in this context. See Silver,
supra note 173, at 288. And see also Beverly Balos, Conferring on the MacCrate Report: A
Clinical Gaze, 1 CLIN. L. REV. 349, 357-61 (1994) (critiquing MacCrate Report for failing
to sufficiently consider disability-based discrimination).
In the editing of this article for the Clinical Law Review, the editor questioned
whether the term "sanism" is not sufficiently "widely known and accepted" by other
clinical teachers (e-mail, March 10, 2002, on file with author). That may be, though a search
of WESTLAW/JLR for SANIS! reveals a data-base of 119 articles (search done February
13, 2003). Assuming that about 25 of these articles are ones I wrote, that still leaves an n of
nearly 100 scholarly papers the authors of which are familiar with the concept.
193 For an important exception, see Paula Galowitz, Collaboration Between Lawyers and
Social Workers: Re-examining The Nature and Potential of the Relationship, 67 FORDHAM
L. REV. 2123 (1999).
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been no attempts, so far, to answer the question that has bedeviled
civil rights activists since the 1950's: "how to capture 'the hearts and
minds' of the American public so as to best insure that statutorily and
judicially articulated rights are incorporated - freely and willingly -
into the day-to-day fabric and psyche of society."'1 94
On the other hand, I am somewhat optimistic about the faint
glimmers of interest in the intersection between therapeutic jurispru-
dence (TJ)195 and clinical teaching. In a recent article, Professor Keri
Gould and I argued that "therapeutic jurisprudence provides a new
and exciting approach to clinical teaching. By incorporating TJ princi-
ples in both classroom and fieldwork components of clinic courses,
law professors can help students gain new and important insights into
some of the most difficult problems regularly raised in clinical classes
and practice settings."1 96 In doing so, we explicitly warned that "thera-
peutic jurisprudence analyses must be undertaken with a full aware-
ness of the impact of sanism and pretextuality on all aspects of the
mental disability law system."' 97 In an earlier article, Professor Mary
Berkheiser had identified several areas in which TJ holds out "promis-
ing prospects" for clinical legal education.1 98 She explored four topics:
"(a) problem solving, (b) client counseling, (c) self-reflection or
'learning to learn,' and (d) professional responsibility.' 199 In all of
these, I contend, an understanding of sanism will enrich the entire
enterprise. 200
194 See Michael L. Perlin, The ADA and Persons with Mental Disabilities: Can Sanist
Attitudes Be Undone?, 8 J. L. & HEALTH 15, 22-23 (1993-94). The "hearts and minds"
phrase was first used in Chief Justice Warren's opinion in Brown v. Board of Educ. of
Topeka, 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954); see also, e.g., In re Demos, 500 U.S. 16 (1991) (Marshall,
J., dissenting from denial of certiorari); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 445
(1968).
195 Therapeutic jurisprudence presents a new model by which we can assess the ultimate
impact of case law and legislation that affects mentally disabled individuals, studying the
role of the law as a therapeutic agent, recognizing that substantive rules, legal procedures
and lawyers' roles may have either therapeutic or anti-therapeutic consequences, and ques-
tioning whether such rules, procedures, and roles can or should be reshaped so as to en-
hance their therapeutic potential, without subordinating due process principles. Perlin,
Misdemeanor Outlaw, supra note 14, at 228. See generally ESSAYS IN THERAPEUTIC JURIS-
PRUDENCE (David B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick eds., 1991); LAW IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY:
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE (David B. Wexler & Bruce J.
Winick eds., 1996); THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 34; THERAPEUTIC JURIS-
PRUDENCE APPLIED: ESSAYS ON MENTAL HEALTH LAW (Bruce J. Winick ed., 1997); David
B. Wexler, Putting Mental Health Into Mental Health Law: Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 16 L.
& HUM. BEHAV. 27 (1992).
196 Gould & Perlin, supra note 7, at 342.
197 Id. at 342. See also 342-43 n.35 (discussing sanism in this context).
198 Berkheiser, supra note 164, at 1155.
199 Id.
200 A robust literature has begun to develop in the areas of holistic and preventive law.
See, e.g., Warren Anderson, Ecumenical Cosmology, 27 TEX. TECH L. REV. 983, 1000
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But sadly, clinical educators have - at least in the literature -
been largely blind to the corrosive and ravaging forces of sanism.2°t
The real tragedy is that no one has mentioned it until now.
B. Sanism and Clinical Students
In considering the ways in which sanism affects clinical students,
there are at least three questions that we must seek to answer: (1) Are
students who take clinical courses more or less sanist than other stu-
dents? (2) How do clinical students manifest sanism?, and (3) How
can sanism be combated in clinical settings?
1. Clinical Students' Susceptibility to Sanism
Discussing the law school classroom, Lila Coleburn and Julia
Spring have suggested: "If [the law student] speaks without emotions,
he is untrue to himself, but if he speaks with them, he may be laughed
out of the class as touchy-feely. '2 2 Discussing alternative dispute res-
olution classes, Professor Jean Sternlight similarly observed:
ADR survey courses attract a diverse mix of students. Some
are drawn to ADR because they are uncomfortable with adversarial
approaches and litigation. Such students tend to enjoy the negotia-
tion and mediation portions of the material and recoil a bit from
arbitration. Others take the course because they believe it would be
useful for litigation or because it meets at a convenient time. Some
of these students prefer the traditional arbitration material, focusing
on cases and doctrine, to what they perceive as more "touchy feely"
content. 20 3
And addressing the need for students to develop rapport with the
client, Professor Peter Margulies, in an article entitled, Refraining
(1996); Susan Daicoff, Making Law Therapeutic for Lawyers: Therapeutic Jurisprudence,
Preventive Law, and the Psychology of Lawyers, 5 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL'Y. & L. 811 (1999);
Dennis P. Stolle, David B. Wexler, Bruce J. Winick & Edward A. Dauer, Integrating Pre-
ventive Law and Therapeutic Jurisprudence: A Law and Psychology Based Approach to
Lawyering, 34 CAL. W. L. REV. 15 (1997); Dennis Stolle, Professional Responsibility in
Elder Law: A Synthesis of Preventive Law and Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 14 BEHAV. ScI.
& L. 257 (1996). See also Perlin, supra note 16, at 409 ("Therapeutic jurisprudence offers a
path by which sanism and pretextuality may, eventually, be neutralized, so that mental
disability law may eventually become a law of healing").
201 This is not to say, of course, that "all clinical teachers are sanists." I have been en-
riched by many discussions with clinical professors who have told me of examples of their
practice - in the representation of criminal defendants and civil litigants - that reject sanist
assumptions and that reflect thoughtful, sensitive lawyering on behalf of persons with
mental disabilities (and those so perceived). By writing this article, I hope to encourage
more of my colleagues to follow this path.
202 Lila Coleburn & Julia Spring, Socrates Unbound: Developmental Perspectives on the
Law School Experience, 24 LAw & PSYCHOL. REV. 5, 27 (2000).
203 Jean Sternlight, Is Binding Arbitration a Form of ADR?: An Argument That The
Term "ADR" Has Begun to Outlive Its Usefulness, 2000 J. Disp. RESOL. 97, 103 n.33.
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Empathy in Clinical Legal Education, points out, "Often we 'sell' the
importance of connection to students, who are wary of touchy-feely
perspectives, by pointing out the instrumental aspects of rapport. 20 4
Certainly, clinical courses appear to attract students more com-
fortable with what these authors refer to as "touchy-feely" perspec-
tives. 20 5 My experiences in teaching clinical students about "active
listening" were certainly mixed. Some were able to grasp it and do it;
others simply parroted the text (Binder-Price) and never appeared to
internalize the skills in any meaningful way. 206 This, however, begs the
question: Does this, in and of itself, make them less likely to be
sanist?207 To this, I have no answers, other than to point out that -
and I have certainly never studied this in any way that could be relia-
bly validated - those students who had decided upon a career in
mental disability law did seem to manifest less sanism in the clinical
setting than did other students.20 8
2. Manifestation of Sanism by Clinical Students
Clinical students - like virtually all students I have ever
204 5 CLIN. L. REV. 605, 624 (1999).
205 Women regularly outnumber men by a 3-1 or 4-1 ratio in my clinic. In the mental
disability law workshop, a "typical" section has 10 women and 2 men. I most recently
taught Mental Health Law (a non-skills course that deals with underlying issues of civil and
constitutional mental disability law) in the fall 2001 term. At that time, there were approxi-
mately 25 women and five men in my class. This past term, five NYLS students registered
for my on-line Survey of Mental Disability Law course; four were female and one was
male. In my current seminar on Therapeutic Jurisprudence, there are eight women and
two men. These numbers are fully consistent with my experiences since 1985, when I first
taught my Mental Health Law course.
206 See Joshua Rosenberg, Teaching Empathy in Law School, 36 U.S.F. L. REV. 621
(2002), for a recent thoughtful article on a related issue.
207 See Pauline Tesler, Collaborative Law a New Paradigm for Divorce Lawyers, 5
PSYCHOL., PUB. POL'Y & L. 967, 970 n.10 (1999) (discussing Susan Daicoff, Lawyer, Know
Thyself: A Review of Empirical Research on Attorney Attributes Bearing on Professional-
ism, 46 AM. U. L. REV. 1337, 1415 (1997)) (research indicates that one effect of legal
education is to "intensify law students' tendencies to ignore emotions, interpersonal con-
cerns, and warm interpersonal relations ... this preference may become extreme and thus
dysfunctional during law school and thereafter. It may contribute to an unbalanced ap-
proach to life and difficulties relating to peers ... and clients, thus increasing dissatisfaction
and distress"); see also Stephen Reich, Psychological Inventory: Profile of a Sample of
First-Year Law Students, 39 PSYCHOL. REP. 871 871-74 (1976).
Again, consider the connection to therapeutic jurisprudence: "Therapeutic jurispru-
dence focuses on the law's impact on emotional life." Gould & Perlin, supra note 7, at 353
(citing Dennis P. Stolle & David B. Wexler, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Preventive Law:
A Combined Concentration to Invigorate the Everyday Practice of Law, 39 ARIZ. L. REV.
25 (1997)).
208 On the fascinating collateral question of the impact of disability on the clinical edu-
cation student selection process, see Sande Buhai, Practice Makes Perfect: Reasonable Ac-




taught20 9 - resolutely adhere to a series of myths about persons with
mental disabilities. 210 These include the following:
" Like other lawyers, clinical students frequently presume that
persons with mental illness are incompetent to engage in au-
tonomous decisionmaking. 21 Students typically apply that pre-
sumption to matters directly involving mental disability law
issues (commitment, treatment, etc.), choice of trial strategy,
and external "life decisions" (choice of housing, employment,
etc.).
" Like other lawyers, clinical students often complain, in refer-
ring to their clients with mental disabilities, that "the clients
could try harder." Students are impatient with persons with
mental disabilities (especially in cases involving governmental
benefits that turn on one's capacity to work), and do not be-
lieve that a mental impairment should be considered disabling
in the same way that certain physical impairments may be.2 12
Clinical students sometimes complain that persons with mental
disabilities "get too much of a free ride" from governmental
assistance programs, and may be prone to view such programs
as inhibiting their clients from "trying harder." These attitudes
track the common sanist myth that mental illness is somehow
the mentally ill person's "fault. '213
209 In addition to teaching five mental disability law-based courses, I also teach Criminal
Law, Civil Procedure, and Criminal Procedure: Adjudication. Again, to be clear: Those
students who plan on a career in mental health advocacy rarely (if ever) adhere to these
myths. I have been extraordinarily fortunate as a law professor to have had such a high
number of my students follow this career path; both in New York and New Jersey, and in
distant states (including Washington, New Mexico, Utah, Massachusetts, New Hampshire,
and elsewhere). These students are - no coincidences here - among the ones who regu-
larly rejected these myths.
210 See infra note 220.
211 See supra text accompanying notes 70-72.
212 Each year, I offer the following hypothetical to my Civil Procedure class: "Imagine
that you are a personal injury lawyer and have two cases that are ready for jury trial. You
will not be able to pay your monthly bills if you are not successful on behalf of your client.
One of your clients has a kneecap that was shattered in an automobile accident (and you
have x-rays, treatment records, etc.); the other has suffered psychic trauma in a different
automobile accident (and you have the testimony of his treating psychologist). Which case
would you want to bring to trial?"
In the thirteen years that I have been teaching the course, I have never had a single
student either "vote" for the psychic trauma case or view that case as a serious alternative.
Certainly this may reflect my students' (probably accurate) perceptions of societal views
rather than their own prejudices, but the post-hypothetical discussions generally reflect the
same sort of sanism I discuss elsewhere in this article.
213 On the perceived connection between sickness and sin, see, e.g. Bernard Weiner, On
Sin Versus Sickness: A Theory of Perceived Responsibility and Social Motivation, 48 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 957 (1993) (proposing conceptual system of social motivation to balance
societal tendencies that encourage punishment for those who demonstrate a "lack of ef-
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* Like other lawyers, clinical students look primarily for visual
clues as an indicator of whether a client is "truly" mentally dis-
abled, thereby falling into a cognitive error made by trial and
appellate judges for decades.214
" Like other lawyers, clinical students express fear of their men-
tally disabled clients' potential dangerousness, rejecting the
rich database that has proven - conclusively - that mental
illness is only a "modest" risk factor for dangerous behavior 215
and that an overwhelming proportion of the population of per-
sons with mental illness is not dangerous. 216
* Like other lawyers, clinical students assume that "quality of
life" concerns are less significant for persons with mental disa-
bilities, and that issues such as housing, family relationships,
and job satisfaction do not "count" as much.
* Like other lawyers, clinic students tend to disbelieve what their
mentally disabled clients tell them if the information does not
conform to the student's stereotype of what a mentally disabled
person "is like. ' 217 If such a client speaks of past employment
as a professional or of having earned graduate degrees or of
having once lived in an upper class suburb, such information is
rejected out of hand (and often is viewed as evidence of the
client's "craziness" (and thus inherent untrustworthiness)).
" Like other lawyers, clinical students express discomfort about
representing persons with mental disabilities when the court-
ordered outcome of a case might not be in the client's "best
interests. "218
fort" or are "responsible" for their failure). For a historical overview, see Norman Dain,
Madness and the Stigma of Sin in American Christianity, in STIGMA AND MENTAL ILLNESS
73 (Paul Fink & Allan Tasman eds., 1992).
214 See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin, "The Borderline Which Separated You From Me": The
Insanity Defense, the Authoritarian Spirit, the Fear of Faking, and the Culture of Punish-
ment, 82 IowA L. REV. 1375, 1409 (1997) ("defendants' criminal responsibility is still being
assessed by visual frames of reference: if he didn't 'seem frenzied' or appear insane, then
'there's no craziness here'). Id. at 1422 (explaining how our insanity defense jurispru-
dence relies upon "a fixed vision of popular, concrete, visual images of craziness").
215 Monahan, supra note 23, §§ 7-2.0-7-2.4, at 300.
216 Id. See also Rende Binder, Are the Mentally Ill Dangerous?, 27 J. AM. ACAD. PSY-
CHIATRY & L. 189, 195 (1999); John Monahan, Assessment, Scientific Validity and Eviden-
tiary Admissibility, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 901 (2000).
217 For an example of one set of these stereotypes, see William Breakey et al., Stigma
and Stereotype: Homeless Mentally Ill Persons, in STIGMA, supra note 4, at 97.
218 I ask my students to think about this attitude and to contrast it with the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel in criminal prosecutions. Then I ask what they would do if
they were ordered to represent, say, Tony Soprano. Or if they were working for a law firm
during the summer, and that firm was representing a corporation accused by a regulatory
agency of being a toxic polluter. In both cases, students invariably tell me that my hypo is
"different," and that they would have no problems representing such individuals.
Spring 2003]
CLINICAL LAW REVIEW
* Like other lawyers. clinical students frequently engage in a pre-
reflective "ordinary common sense" (OCS) in approaching
their clinical case assignments.219 This OCS frequently involves
sanist stereotypes about persons with mental disabilities. 22
0
On clinic-specific issues, students often complain in other ways
about representing persons with mental disabilities. They complain,
specifically, about:
This hypo should not be read to suggest that I do not believe that Tony Soprano has a
right to vigorous counsel. I do believe, however, that a lawyer in a private law firm who
does not want to represent a civil client may have a right to decline the case assignment,
with a full understanding that that decision may adversely affect her employment future
with the firm in question.
219 See Gould & Perlin, supra note 7, at 357; Perlin, Neonaticide, supra, note 14.
220 See Perlin, supra note 5, at 393-97:
These are a few of the sanist myths that dominate our social discourse:
1. Mentally ill individuals are "different," and, perhaps, less than human. They are
erratic, deviant, morally weak, sexually uncontrollable, emotionally unstable, super-
stitious, lazy, ignorant and demonstrate a primitive morality. They lack the capacity
to show love or affection. They smell different from "normal" individuals, and are
somehow worth less.
2. Most mentally ill individuals are dangerous and frightening. They are invariably
more dangerous than non-mentally ill persons, and such dangerousness is easily and
accurately identified by experts. At best, people with mental disabilities are simple
and content, like children. Either parens patriae or police power supply a rationale
for the institutionalization of all such individuals.
3. Mentally ill individuals are presumptively incompetent to participate in "nor-
mal" activities, to make autonomous decisions about their lives (especially in areas
involving medical care), and to participate in the political arena.
4. If a person in treatment for mental illness declines to take prescribed antip-
sychotic medication, that decision is an excellent predictor of (1) future dangerous-
ness and (2) need for involuntary institutionalization.
5. Mental illness can easily be identified by lay persons and matches up closely to
popular media depictions. It comports with our common sense notion of crazy
behavior.
6. It is, and should be, socially acceptable to use pejorative labels to describe and
single out people who are mentally ill; this singling out is not problematic in the way
that the use of pejorative labels to describe women, blacks, Jews or gays and lesbians
might be.
7. Mentally ill individuals should be segregated in large, distant institutions because
their presence threatens the economic and social stability of residential communities.
8. The mentally disabled person charged with crime is presumptively the most dan-
gerous potential offender, as well as the most morally repugnant one. The insanity
defense is used frequently and improperly as a way for such individuals to beat the
rap; insanity tests are so lenient that virtually any mentally ill offender gets a free
ticket through which to evade criminal and personal responsibility. The insanity de-
fense should be considered only when the mentally ill person demonstrates objective
evidence of mental illness.
9. Mentally disabled individuals simply don't try hard enough. They give in too
easily to their basest instincts, and do not exercise appropriate self restraint.
10. If "do-gooder", activist attorneys had not meddled in the lives of people with
mental disabilities, such individuals would be where they belong (in institutions), and
all of us would be better off. In fact, there's no reason for courts to involve them-
selves in all mental disability cases.
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" difficulty in interviewing (especially in coping with narrative
styles that may differ radically from those of persons without
mental disabilities). If a client says something that appears
"crazy," students sometimes may trivialize all of the client's
concerns and question the credibility of the client's entire
account.
" difficulty in investigating (especially if the client is institutional-
ized). 221 It is certainly more difficult to investigate a case on
behalf of a client who has been deprived of freedom of move-
ment (be it civil or criminal), but the fact that a client is often in
a psychiatric hospital makes this a more difficult enterprise in
many ways. Such persons will, for example, have limited access
to cash, to telephones, and to visitors.
* difficulty in counseling. Many clinical students are extraordina-
rily uncomfortable about "acting like a social worker, '222 and
counseling is the aspect of legal practice that most closely ap-
proximates the work of a mental health professional. 223
* difficulty in negotiating. To some extent, cases involving clients
with mental disabilities are negotiated in very different ways
than those involving other clients.2 24 My years as a Public De-
fender and mental health advocate taught me that prosecutors,
221 On the importance of the locus of the interview, see, e.g., Michael Lindsey, Ethical
Issues in Interviewing, Counseling, and the Use of Psychological Data With Child And Ado-
lescent Clients, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 2035, 2042 (1996).
222 The roots of this concept are explored in Kara Nelson, The Release of Juvenile
Records Under Wisconsin's Juvenile Justice Code: A New System of False Promises, 81
MARQ. L. REV. 1101, 1117 (1998).
223 On the confusion often engendered here, see, e.g., Robert Benjamin, A Critique of
Mediation - Challenging Misconceptions, Assessing Risks And Weighing The Advantages,
146 PiTrs. LEGAL J. (June 1998), at 37; Marilyn Levitt, The Elderly Questionably Compe-
tent Client Dilemma: Determining Competency and Dealing with the Incompetent Client, 1
J. HEALTH CARE, LAW & POLICY 202, 217 (1998).
On the special issues involved when a client is charged with a crime, see Binny Miller,
Telling Stories About Cases and Clients: The Ethics of Narrative, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
1, 42-43 (2000) ("Even if the lawyer's case theory prevails, this choice of theory means that
the lawyer has defined the client as mentally ill to the outside world and that he will be
institutionalized until he is found sane. Some clients don't wish to be portrayed as mentally
ill or to be committed for mental health treatment. These clients would rather run a greater
risk of jail on a weaker case theory where the consequences of a winning theory are so
personally devastating").
224 When I was in practice, I represented the class in Schindenwolf v. Klein, No.
L4129375 P.W. (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1979) (final order reprinted in 5 PERLIN, MENTAL
DISABILITY LAW, supra note 2, § 14-4, at 66-74 (2d ed. 2002)) (requiring compensation for
institutionalized persons who perform work for which the institution would otherwise have
to pay an employee). Before we approved the final settlement, my co-counsel (John Ensm-
inger, see e.g., Ensminger & Liguori, supra note 164) and I went to each of the five state
hospitals in which our clients resided, and met with the patients' governing council to ex-
plain the tentative settlement, request feedback and suggestions, and determine whether
there was, in fact, wide-spread support for the settlement.
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attorneys general and other lawyers with whom I came regu-
larly in contact never took negotiation in these cases as seri-
ously, perhaps due to a belief that the stakes were not
particularly high for my client, or perhaps due to an inability to
empathize with my client.
difficulty in resisting the tendency to impose the student's own
views as to what is in the client's best interests (in ways that are
not typical of the ways that lawyers act in "garden variety" civil
and criminal cases).2 25
3. Combating Sanism in the Clinical Setting
There is no question that participation in a clinical course is
stressful - for both students and teacher.226 A student of mine once
came to me, distraught, to tell me that her husband had threatened to
leave her if she continued to work with "those people" (forensic pa-
tients at a NY state psychiatric institution). 227 In a thoughtful piece on
the factors that can influence clinical casework, Professor Ann Juer-
gens includes mental illness as one of the stressors.228 Students who
are thrust into clinical settings are forced to confront "difficult, com-
plex, and often contradictory feelings about what he or she is doing
225 See, e.g., Matter of M.R., 135 N.J. 155, 638 A.2d 1274 (1994) (advocacy diluted by
excessive concern for the client's best interests would raise troubling questions for attor-
neys in an adversarial system; counsel acts without well-defined standards if he or she
forsakes a client's instructions to pursue the attorney's perception of the client's best inter-
ests) (citing Lawrence A. Frolik, Plenary Guardianship: An Analysis, A Critique and A
Proposal for Reform, 23 ARIZ. L. REV. 599, 635 (1981)). See also id. at 634-35 ("if counsel
has already concluded that his client needs 'help,"' he is more likely to provide only proce-
dural formality, rather than vigorous representation). See also Maria M. Das-Neves, The
Role of Counsel in Guardianship Proceedings of the Elderly, 4 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHics 855,
863 (1991) ("[i]f the attorney is directed to consider the client's ability to make a consid-
ered judgment on his or her own behalf, the attorney essentially abdicates his or her advo-
cate's role and leaves the client unprotected from the petitioner's allegations"). Finally, the
attorney who undertakes to act according to a best interest standard may be put into the
position of making decisions about the client's mental capacity that the attorney is unquali-
fied to make. Frolik, supra at 635. See also Matter of Brantley, 260 Kan. 605, 920 P.2d 433,
443 (1996) ("The client has ultimate authority to determine the purposes to be served by
legal representation, within the limits imposed by law and the lawyer's professional obliga-
tions .... in a case in which the client appears to be suffering mental disability, the lawyer's
duty to abide by the client's decisions is to be guided by reference to Rule 1.14."); Buckler
v. Buckler, 195 W. Va. 705, 708, 466 S.E.2d 556, 559 (1995) ("It is not the role of an attor-
ney acting as counsel to independently determine what is best for his client and than act
accordingly. Rather, such an attorney is to allow the client to determine what is in the
client's best interests and than act according to the wishes of that client within the limits of
the law.").
226 Gould & Perlin, supra note 7, at 356.
227 Id. at 356 n.99.
228 Ann Juergens, Teach Your Students Well: Valuing Clients in the Law School Clinic, 2
CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 339, 355 (1993).
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and how he or she is doing it."'229 There is no question that dealing
with mental illness in a client is stressful - especially for a law stu-
dent - and that clinical teachers must acknowledge that and work
with students to combat the causes that lead to such stress.230 The rep-
resentation of "real clients" in clinics - including persons with mental
disabilities - presents "profound moral implications" for every
clinical professor and clinical student. It is imperative that clinical
teachers take seriously the impact of sanism in what their students do,
and how they do it, if this representation is to be authentically
meaningful. 231
IV. CONCLUSION
As I have tried to show in this article, notwithstanding the self-
selection of clinical students,232 clinics are not sanism-free. I believe,
however, that sanism can be rebutted in the clinical setting (notwith-
standing the fact that the stress of clinical education may exacerbate
sanist tensions), perhaps with a healthy infusion of therapeutic juris-
prudence,233 or simply by the clinical professor's use of the "bully pul-
pit" of the clinical classroom to explain sanism 234 and to discuss
229 Gould & Perlin, supra note 7, at 357.
230 See, e.g., Bruce Winick, Redefining the Role of the Criminal Defense Lawyer at Plea
Bargaining and Sentencing: A Therapeutic Jurisprudence/Preventive Law Model, 5
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 1034, 1041 (1999):
Dealing with their criminal charges can be a highly emotional experience for most
defendants. Moreover, when the behavior that resulted in criminal charges is related
to substance abuse, mental illness, or psychologically maladaptive behavior patterns,
confronting the existence of such a problem and coming to terms with the need to
deal with it can produce considerable psychological distress. Dealing with the issue
of rehabilitation and relapse prevention in the context of plea bargaining or sentenc-
ing thus may be regarded, within the terminology of therapeutic jurisprudence/pre-
ventive law, as a psycholegal soft spot. Attorneys involved in these processes need to
be sensitive to the emotional difficulties that dealing with such issues can produce, to
be able to identify a client's psychological distress, and to be able to deal with it
effectively within the attorney-client relationship.
231 Gould & Perlin, supra note 7, at 358-59 (footnotes omitted).
232 1 am not sure any of us is sanism-free. I do believe, however, that this is a goal to
which we all should and must aspire. In a subsequent piece, I plan to write about the
different perspectives of the "patients' rights," "survivors" and "consumers" movements,
and assess those positions through a sanism filter. See Stefan, supra note 87.
233 See, e.g., Berkheiser, supra note 164, at 1171:
Law school clinics provide an experiential setting that is a natural laboratory for
applying therapeutic jurisprudence. As a theory whose purpose is to study the im-
pacts of law on individual wellbeing, therapeutic jurisprudence can enhance clinical
practice and its educational, service, and law reform missions.
234 See Perlin, supra note 188, at 31:
Participants in the mental disability law system must acknowledge these concepts
and must use the "bully pulpits" of the courtroom, the legislative chamber, the public
forum, the bar association, the psychology or psychiatry conference, and the aca-
demic journals to identify and deconstruct sanist and pretextual behaviors whenever
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strategies for dealing with sanist behaviors and attitudes (on the part
of the teacher, the student, court personnel, other lawyers, witnesses,
and anyone else involved in the case).
What else should we do? We must discuss the underlying issues
openly, and "system decision-makers must regularly engage in a series
of 'sanism checks' to insure - to the greatest extent possible - a
continuing conscious and self-reflective evaluation of their decisions
to best avoid sanism's power. '235 At the same time, "judges must ac-
knowledge the pretextual basis of much of the case law in this area
and consciously seek to eliminate it from future decision-making. 236
The issues considered must be added to the research agendas of
social scientists, behaviorists and legal scholars so as to "help illumi-
nate the ultimate impact of sanism on this area of the law, aid
lawmakers and other policymakers in understanding the ways that so-
cial science data is manipulated to serve sanist ends. '237 We must also
find ways to "attitudinally educate counsel ... so that representation
becomes more than the hollow shell it all too frequently is. ''238 Fur-
ther, we need to consider carefully the burden of heuristic thinking,239
especially the ways that judges use such devices in deciding important
cases.
There is much for clinical professors to do here. First, as I just
indicated, they must explain sanism to their students (not just in the
context of "mental disability law" cases,240 but in all cases that in any
way involve persons with mental disabilities or the impact of mental
disabilities on any direct or tangential legal questions), 241 must iden-
tify sanist behaviors, and discuss strategies for confronting, neutraliz-
ing and overcoming such behaviors and attitudes. Second, they must
be alert to the ways that sanist vocabulary creeps into classroom lan-
guage and discourse. When a student uses words like "retard" or "nut-
case," the teacher should deal with the situation in precisely the way
one would if a student were to use a pejorative word to describe
and wherever they occur.
235 PERLIN, HIDDEN PREJUDICE, supra note 2, at 307 (quoting PERLIN, supra note 14, at
440).
236 Id.
237 PERLIN, HIDDEN PREJUDICE, supra note 2, at 307 (quoting PERLIN, supra note 14, at
440-41). Compare Jacobs, supra note 187.
238 PERLIN, HIDDEN PREJUDICE, supra note 2, at 307 (quoting PERLIN, supra note 14, at
441).
239 See supra note 163.
240 On "slotting" in mental disability law cases, see Perlin, supra note 139, at 125 n.112.
241 Clinical caseloads no doubt include a disproportionate number of persons with
mental disabilities. For the first scholarly consideration of the application of sanism to an
area of business law, see Pamela Champine, A Sanist Will?, 46 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. (forth-
coming 2002-03).
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women, African-Americans, gays, Jews, or any other racial or relig-
ious minority. Third, they must consciously and overtly discuss how
perceptions of a client's (or witness's) mental disability affect all as-
pects of a case - including all aspects of lawyering, trial strategy, and
courtroom performance. Fourth, they must be especially vigilant for
the sorts of sanist behavior that I discuss in this paper, and must be
alert for subtle hints of passive-aggressive sanism (e.g., "I just can't
empathize with this guy"; 242 "Professor, how can I do active listening
with my client if he makes me so uncomfortable?"). Fifth, they must
be similarly vigilant in case preparation conferences, so as to identify
behavior that potentially trivializes clients' legal problems and needs.
Sixth, they must urge their law school administration to create more
clinics for representation of persons with mental disabilities.
This list is not meant to be exhaustive. Indeed, it barely skims the
surface of what is needed. I offer it here, however, as an elementary
working blueprint for beginning this struggle. 243
This is not an easy problem. As Mary Berkheiser candidly and
perceptively notes, "Incorporating therapeutic jurisprudence into
clinical teaching, . . could simultaneously create tensions that would
further complicate an already complex educational process. '244 Yet, I
believe that this is a mission that we must undertake - for the integ-
rity of the clinic and the autonomy and personhood of our clients.
In the chorus of Ballad of a Thin Man (from which the title of
this paper derives), Bob Dylan sang:
Because something is happening here
But you don't know what it is
Do you Mister Jones?" 245
For decades we did not know what was happening here. But now
we do. It is time for us to do something.
242 For elaboration on the point that labeling a client as "uncooperative" is "an exercise
in power by the labeler," see Gay Gellhorn, Law and Language: "My Client Won't Coop-
erate" (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Clinical Law Review) (Nov. 5, 2001) (dis-
cussing Jacobs, supra note 187, at 374-75).
243 I explain how I seek to do this in the clinical classroom in Gould & Perlin, supra note
7, at 365-67 (discussing the heroic work by a student, Lisa Bloch, on the Alan Andrews
case).
244 Berkheiser, supra note 164, at 1171.
245 DYLAN, supra note 8, at 198.
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